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AMERICAN HEALTH POLICY
IN THE 1980's
Kenneth R. Wing*
The author notes that the composition of the 'fundamental problem" of rising
health care costs is not easily defined. The varying interests of providers, consumers,
and the government's budget diverge and overlap in a weblike maze, creating multifa-
rious and fractured perspectives regarding what actually constitutes the problem.
Consequently, no underlying ideological thread in American health care policy has
emerged to direct a unified response to the 'fundamental problem." It is in this
political context that American health care policy of the 1980's will be shaped.
Professor Wing has undertaken an exhaustive review of both health care cost data
and the trends that these data reveal He discusses the impact of rising health care
costs on the economy, examining expenditures for hospital services, physician services,
nursing homes, and other services. He considers the rising costs of health care to state
and federal government, particularly the impact of Medicare and Medicaid. Finally,
he comments on the growing costs of health care to the consumer, including both
rising premium payments for private health insurance and growing out-of-pocket pay-
ments. He places these data in the current political context and concludes with some
observations regarding American health care policy into the 1990's.
INTRODUCTION
CRITICS NO LONGER punctuate their descriptions of Ameri-
can health care delivery with bold predictions that we face a
"health care crisis," as they so often did in the 1960's and 1970's.,
In fact, by the 1980's, the rhetoric of "health care crisis" has been
nearly abandoned, presumably because the politics of "health care
crisis" have never really emerged. But while today's health policy
critics are much more sanguine in their predictions for the future,
most continue to describe our present circumstances in terms sug-
gesting that Americans are currently faced with one fundamental
problem. The problem, if not critical, is one that at least requires
immediate attention and one that will soon require some difficult
social and political choices: the need to contain rising health care
* Associate Professor, School of Law and School of Public Health, University of
North Carolina. B.A. (1968), University of California, Santa Cruz; J.D. (1971), M.P.H.
(1972), Harvard University.
1. See, e.g., J. Kennedy, Special Message to Congress on Health and Hospital Care,
1961 PUB. PAPERS 77 (Feb. 9, 1961); R. Finch & R. Egeberg, 5 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
258-59 (Feb. 18, 1971); White, Life and Death and Medicine, 229 Sci. AM., Sept. 1973, at 22.
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costs.2 Indeed, virtually all contemporary health policy debates,
both popular and academic, begin with an all-too-familiar litany of
demonstrative cost statistics: Health care costs have been demand-
ing an increasing proportion of the gross national product (GNP);
health care cost inflation continues to outpace inflation in general;
and the aggregate, annual cost of health care has reached almost
unbelievable levels and can be extrapolated beyond the unbelievable
in the coming years.'
These cost statistics do highlight a problem of fundamental pro-
portions, even if a full and informed appreciation of the implica-
tions of rising health care costs requires a much closer examination
and the disaggregation of available data, as will be demonstrated in
later sections of this Article.4 After critically examining the costs of
health care, no one could seriously question two essential observa-
tions: that "something must be done"-and done fairly quickly-to
contain these costs; and that attempts to contain rising health care
costs will soon have substantial impact on the manner and organi-
zation by which health care is financed and delivered in this
country.
Acknowledgment of the fundamental importance of health care
cost containment for contemporary health policy, however, does
not mean that health care cost containment is the dominant or focal
issue of American health politics in the 1980's. Such a suggestion
would miscast, at least rhetorically, prevailing circumstances, as
well as misjudge, as did those who predicted a "health care crisis"
in earlier decades, the realities of American health politics in some
important and fundamental ways. Thus, before discussing the costs
of health care more fully, several prefatory observations must be
made to somewhat refine current notions regarding the need for-as
well as the prospects for-health care cost containment.
I. THE CONTEXT
To begin with the most basic, any assessment of our present cir-
cumstances should emphasize that Americans face not a single or
dominating health care cost-containment problem, but rather a se-
2. See, eg., Bayer, Justice and Health Care in an Era of Cost Containment, 9 Soc.
REsP.: JOURNALISM, L., MED. 37 (1983); W. MCCLURE & C. WELLER, COMPETITION AND
THE HEALTH CARE PLAN THERAPY FOR MEDICAL MARKETS: AN ANTITRUST POLICY
AND HISTORICAL SYNTHESIS (1983); Scitovsky, "The High Cost of Dying" What Do the
Data Show?, 62 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 591 (1984).
3. See infra Table 1 and Figure 1.
4. See infra notes 37-71.
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ries of related but distinct and, above all, potentially conflicting
cost-containmentproblems. At the very least, any description of the
rising costs of health care, even the most introductory, should
clearly distinguish between the rising costs of health care to the
economy and the direct costs to government-the growing costs of
Medicare and Medicaid, public employee medical benefits, and
other health-related, state and federal governmental expenditures.
Both the costs of health care to the economy and the costs to the
government should then be distinguished from the cost problems
for various consumers-the inflating costs of health insurance pre-
miums, the increasing risk of catastrophic loss from illness or disa-
bility, and the rising cost of individual out-of-pocket payments.
Politically speaking, the costs to the economy, 5 the costs to the gov-
ernment,6 and the costs to various consumers7 are each severable
problems, the assessment of which, and more important, the resolu-
tion or containment of which, can be achieved independently.
Thus, the "fundamental problem" may be defined by referring to
any or all of these costs, depending on one's ideological or political
loyalties, and preferences for various reforms or political responses
will be skewed accordingly.
Moreover, the distinguishable implications of the rising costs of
health care for the various providers, employers, insurers, suppliers,
and the many other actors and institutions on the complicated land-
scape of American health care politics further fractionalize the
political reality of the "fundamental problem" and, therefore, the
health policy agenda of the 1980's. Rather than creating a single or
focal issue, rising health care costs have created a divisive political
struggle among competing interest groups. Defining the nature of
the problem is as controversial as fashioning a remedy; and the re-
form or remedy sought for one problem, as frequently as not, would
only exacerbate the other problems.
This refinement of the "fundamental problem" does not refute
the notion that these severable cost-containment problems are at
least partially convergent in their origins. As reviewed in later sec-
tions of this Article, isolating the causal factors responsible for ris-
ing health care costs is a complicated and somewhat imprecise task.
Nonetheless, at the heart of the problem, as it is defined from virtu-
ally any perspective, lie several basic factors, including the most im-
portant-continuing inflation of the price of individual medical
5. See infra notes 23-146 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 147-203 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 204-64 and accompanying text.
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services." But notwithstanding these underlying causal links-and
the resulting potential for political alliance among those similarly
affected-these various cost problems have been remarkably diver-
gent in terms of how they are defined in the political arenas and in
terms of the strategies that are adopted by various interest groups to
avoid or mitigate their impact.
Thus, to cite perhaps the most relevant example, the fiscally
conservative congressman, whatever his sympathy for those who
cry "something must be done" about the rising portion of the GNP
spent on health care, primarily perceives the "fundamental prob-
lem" as rising federal expenditures. Though he may appreciate that
both problems can be traced to such factors as rising medical care
prices, he will, nonetheless, prefer to resolve the "fundamental
problem" through increases in Medicare cost-sharing, limits on
Medicaid eligibility, and the like, rather than through financing or
other systemic reforms intended to directly impact on the price of
medical services.
Ironically, his equally conservative state counterpart, who may
be particularly enamored with the radical reforms espoused by ne-
oconservative theorists, may nonetheless spend most of her political
time and energy devising strategies to resolve a cost problem similar
in definition to that of the federal legislator but with an opposite
result: shifting more of the state's health budget to Medicaid and
other federal programs. To their constituent consumers, even those
savvy enough to understand the broader problems caused by rising
health care costs or the underlying causes of those costs, the cost-
containment problem is almost certain to be defined in terms more-
immediate and parochial: "do something" about our bills, our po-
tential for bankruptcy, and our inflating premiums. Providers, co-
alitions of employers, insurance carriers and brokers, and union
representatives shift from one political camp to the next, as they
follow their own perceptions of the "fundamental problem" and of
their short-term self-interest, forming temporary and sometimes
rather odd alliances-frequently crossing traditional political
lines-on an issue-by-issue basis.
Almost parenthetically, an opposite trend could be easily
imagined. In the most obvious scenario, a sufficiently powerful coa-
lition comprised of consumer groups, political liberals, budget-con-
scious state and federal legislators, employers, and others whose
cost problems can be traced to the same underlying causes could
8. See infra notes 50-68.
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overcome the political resistance to tackling such causal factors as
price inflation and pursue a broad and concerted cost-containment
strategy. It may well have been such imagination that prompted
the rhetoric of crisis in earlier decades or that continues to inspire
many of today's health policy critics both to speak in terms that
suggest we are faced with a single "fundamental problem" and to
advocate systemic reform strategies. But the political battles of the
last decades tell us that such imagining is indeed chimerical. The
political strategy of preference, or at least of necessity, has been to
define health care cost problems narrowly and to focus on efforts to
shift or avoid health care costs on an issue-by-issue basis. This
strategy has predominated, often in spite of political alliance and, as
many would argue, in spite of the long-term consequences of such
political expediency for cost containment in the broadest sense of
the term.
The reasons for this political state of affairs are not altogether
clear, but there are several which are evident. First of all, and
worth repeating, health policy issues generally, and health care cost
containment in particular, inevitably involve enormous and compli-
cated conflicts, both political and economic. The cost-containment
problem of the budget-conscious legislator is clearly different than
that of the traditional liberal. The health care costs that concern
macroeconomists are not those which concern organized consumer
groups, nor are macroeconomic estimates of economic costs the
particular costs that concern professionals schooled in public health
traditions. In the realm of health policy and politics, one person's
cost containment potentially creates another's cost problem. For
that matter, one person's cost problem can be another's profit mar-
gin. The delivery of health care is, after all, one activity that can be
simultaneously described as a system on the brink of crisis and as a
strong and growing industry, with equal accuracy.
Other factors shed more direct light on the failure of potential
alliances to amalgamate around broader reform strategies and effec-
tive cost containment. Health care policy issues, whether defined in
terms of cost or otherwise, have rarely commanded the continued
attention-or the consistent voting behavior-of the public at large.
Thus, there has been no sustained groundswell of public opinion
upon which to build political coalitions for major health care re-
form, at least since the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid in the
1960's. 9 Nor has there been a particularly good ideological light-
9. See generally T. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE (1973).
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ning rod for opinion or around which various interest groups could
coalesce.
Americans and American politics do have a longstanding and
easily aroused egalitarian tradition, traceable through a patchwork
of generously funded public programs, and evidenced by an appar-
ent unwillingness to overtly accept the denial of medical care to
virtually anyone. Indeed, the strength of that tradition should not
be underrated when assessing the political prospects for cost con-
tainment, as will be discussed below. But just as clearly, that tradi-
tion falls far short of any broad-based or sustained public support
for programs that are perceived (or labeled) as socializing health or
medical care, or for any "big Government," particularly "big Fed-
eral Government," health care reform measure or cost-containment
strategy. Thus, whatever the merits of extending the regulatory
strategies that were initiated in the late 1960's and early 1970's,
strong and sustained public support for hospital cost containment,
certificate of need programs, and other "command and control"
regulatory programs has been virtually nonexistent.10 Similarly,
while the banner of national health insurance has occasionally gar-
nered the public's attention, it has failed to attract enough sustained
support to weather the long-term demands of the political process
and has yet to emerge as an important election issue.1
On the other hand, notwithstanding the resurgence of conserva-
tive politics in the last decade, "market-based strategies for health
care reform have also had little success in capturing the public im-
agination or the political fancy of enough interest groups, particu-
larly as "competition" has been translated into discrete political
choices. Thus far, the political track record of the New Federalism,
including proposals for reduced tax subsidies for employer-
purchased health insurance, vouchers for Medicare, and other dic-
tates of neoconservative ideology for health policy, has been unim-
pressive." A few privately initiated and arguably competitive
10. See K. WING, THE LAW AND THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH 120-29 (2d ed. 1985).
11. For a discussion of the "high water mark" period for political interest in national
health insurance and the reasons for its political demise, see Wing & Silton, Constitutional
Authority for Extending Federal Control Over the Delivery of Health Care, 57 N.C.L. REV.
1423, 1423-28 (1979).
12. See, eg., C. HAVIGHURsT, DEREGULATING THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY: PLAN-
NING FOR COMPETITION (1982); A. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN: THE ONLY PRACTICAL
SOLUTION TO THE SOARING COST OF MEDICAL CARE (1980); Enthoven, A New Proposal to
Reform the Tax Treatment of Health Insurance, 3 HEALTH AFF., Spr. 1984, at 21; McClure,
Implementing a Competitive Medical Care System Through Public Policy, 7 J. HEALTH POL.,
POL'Y & L. 2 (1982).
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characters have clearly emerged in the last years in health care de-
livery, such as business coalitions, preferred provider organizations,
and other alternative financing schemes. But whether these new
characters will have a significant impact on health care costs or on
tht. public's attitude towards competition and market-based strate-
gies for health policy has yet to be determined.
What has been impressive, well organized, and politically sus-
tained, however, is the political clout of provider interests, meaning
not just individual medical practitioners, but, in particular, repre-
sentatives of the hospital and nursing home industries, as well as
their suppliers, financiers, and the others who share in the distribu-
tion of the ever-expanding health care dollar. To the public, provid-
ers prefer to posture themselves as the victims and not the
perpetrators of rising costs. In the corridors of political power,
however, they have unabashedly exhibited an intimidating and pow-
erful political presence, successfully defending their economic self-
interest, their professional autonomy, and their predominantly pri-
vate, but not necessarily competitive, character. Indeed, the course
of federal health policy over the last several decades has been af-
fected as much by the political influence of provider interests as it
has been by any other political constraint.13
Surely this political strength has been losing some ground in the
1980's. In this regard, the political significance of Congress impos-
ing both diagnosis-related group (DRG) reimbursement on hospi-
tals and several years of reimbursement freezes on physicians in the
mid-1980's far exceeds the economic significance of either mea-
sure.14 Yet, just as surely, provider influence over health policy has
only been bent, not broken, by recent politics. As one measure of
their continuing influence, one can look to their success, even in this
decade of DRGs and rate freezes, in seeking reimbursement for "in-
digent care" or for what they characterize as their "uncontrollable
expenditures."15 They have also been successful in influencing deci-
13. See, e.g., P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE
(1982); T. MARMOR, supra note 9; D. HIRSCHFIELD, THE LOST REFORM (1970); Wing &
Silton, supra note 11, at 1431-38.
14. For a description of DRG-based reimbursement and its impact on hospitals, see
Lave, Hospital Reimbursement Under Medicare, 62 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 251
(1984). For a description of the freeze on physician reimbursement imposed under the Medi-
care program, see Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2306, 98 Stat. 1061,
1070; H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1313-15, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1445, 2001-03.
15. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 395.101, 409.2662 (West Supp. 1985); see also Kinney,
Medicare Payment to Hospitals for a Return on Capital- The Influence of Federal Budget
Policy on Judicial Decision-Making, 11 J. CONTEMP. L. 453 (1985).
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sions regarding DRG designations, cost-of-living inflators, and
other economically crucial, but less publicly visible, decisions,
where raw power and sustainable infighting are most advanta-
geous.16 Providers may no longer be able to resist all efforts to con-
tain costs, but their influence on the manner in which the
"fundamental problem" is politically defined and in which that
problem may be addressed and contained will continue to be a ma-
jor political constraint on the health policy agenda of the 1980's.
The result of these political circumstances is an agenda for
health policy issues that is both complex and quixotic. It is ordered
as much by the political power of those affected by each issue and
by the happenstance of political events as it is by any notion of the
relative importance of the variously defined cost problem(s). More
important, the net result of this agenda is almost certain to be a
frustration of any attempt at major or systemic reform of health
care delivery or its financing, as the focus of political attention con-
tinually shifts from the heart to the periphery of the problem(s).
Under such circumstances, cost containment in its broadest sense,
and to the extent that it is achieved at all, is more likely to be a
byproduct of concerns for more narrowly drawn and short-term
cost problems than it is to be a result of focused attention or of a
dominating concern for a "fundamental problem."
If there is a key to understanding the political reality of the
health policy agenda in the 1980's, it lies in the distinction between,
on the one hand, the lack of sustained political interest or ideologi-
cal commitment of most Americans towards health policy issues
and, on the other, the strong and easily aroused egalitarian impulse
of that same American public. That same distinction can be stated
somewhat differently: while Americans are unlikely to rally around
market-based or competitive strategies, liberal-designed regulatory
programs, nationalized health financing schemes, or, for that mat-
ter, any particular reform strategy for its ideological implications,
we are and will continue to be quick to rally around more concrete
and immediate issues, as well as programs perceived as necessary to
our health care. We are concerned with the outcomes, or, better
said, what we perceive as the outcomes of health policy decisions,
not the decisions' ideological roots, or even their underlying ration-
ale. We are not health policy liberals or conservatives because we
are not concerned with health policy per se. Nor is our concern,
16. See Morone & Dunham, Slouching Towards National Health Insurance: The New
Health Care Politics, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 263 (1985); Rosenblum, Medicare Revisited: A
Look Through the Past to the Future, 9 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 669 (1985).
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when aroused, necessarily based in either conservative or liberal
principles. We are, however, quite concerned with what we per-
ceive we need and, to our credit, what we perceive our fellow Amer-
icans need-American medicine.
As critics have long argued, such a political posture is neither
logical nor consistent. The price of providing American medicine
for virtually everyone is extraordinarily expensive, both in the pop-
ular sense and even more so under sophisticated economic analysis.
Even in carrying out the apparent dictates of that egalitarian im-
pulse, the current manner in which American medical care is deliv-
ered and financed is neither economically efficient nor equitable in
its distributional result.17 For that matter, increasingly persuasive
evidence indicates that modern American medicine is not particu-
larly cost effective, especially when compared to the health
problems of our aging, postindustrialized society.' 8
But neither the graphs and models of the economic theorists nor
the health-promotion and disease-prevention strategies of public
health reformers have had visible impact on the public perception of
the value of medical care services. For that matter, neither have the
constant reminders that the nation faces a "fundamental problem"
in rising health care costs aroused much public concern or substan-
tially altered either the perception that medical care is valuable or
the egalitarian impulse for its distribution. Thus, Medicaid,
notwithstanding several rounds of de facto program reductions, sur-
vived the onslaught of Reagan-era domestic spending reductions, as
Congress found a surprising level of public support for "welfare
medicine."' 9 Medicare, even as it is depicted as a program on the
brink of bankruptcy, still requires gentle handling lest the public
perceive a retreat from a fifty-year-old social contract.20
Americans react with equal dismay to increases in the out-of-
17. See P. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS 143-50 (2d ed. 1983) (supply of
medical care); id. at 91-99 (demand creation, especially regarding the role of physicians); id.
at 152-57 (the market for health insurance); and id. at 198-234 (the market for hospital serv-
ices). See also Gabel & Rice, Reducing Public Expenditures for Physician Services: The Price
ofPaying Less, 9 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 595 (1985); Hurd, Provision of Health Care to
Indigents: Failure at the Local Level in Light of Decreasing Federal Assistance, 27 WASH.
U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 295 (1984); Bayer, supra note 2.
18. See, e.g., Waldo & Lazenby, Demographic Characteristics and Health Care Use and
Expenditures by the Aged in the United States: 1977-84, 6 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Fall
1984, at 1; Fuchs, "Though Much is Taken:" Reflections on Aging, Health, and Medical
Care, 62 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 143 (1984).
19. See Wing, The Impact of Reagan-Era Politics on the Federal Medicaid Program, 33
CATH. U.L. REV. 1, 71 (1983).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 203-04.
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pocket portion of their insurance premiums and to increases in their
deductibles or co-insurance intended to mitigate those premium in-
creases. At the same time, they persist in the belief that health in-
surance coverage is inadequate if anything less than comprehensive;
anything less is perceived as a barrier to their medical care. Ameri-
cans, while generally uncomfortable with big government, have no
objection to a large government subsidy for employer-purchased
health insurance, even in an era when tax reform is apparently pop-
ular. And while they nod knowingly at published accounts of un-
necessary surgery-surely we all "know" that the doctors are
ripping us off-they react with horror when government-sponsored,
utilization-review decisions "throw old people out of the hospi-
tals."21 Perhaps no better illustration of our public temperament
can be found than the public's collective and individual responses to
the plight of organ transplant patients who need donations to sup-
port their treatment.22
Whether all this sets the stage for sound public policy, makes for
sensible economics, or, for that matter, amounts to rational behav-
ior is somewhat beside the point; it does make for fairly predictable,
albeit somewhat fickle, political behavior. It also helps to define the
reality of the "fundamental problem," charting the political future
of cost containment as much as do the complexities of the problem,
the political power of providers, or any other political observation
discussed above.
This Article outlines in more detail the costs of health care for
the American economy, for state and federal governments, and for
the consumer. From the point of view of assessing either public
policy or contemporary politics, these problems can and should be
distinguished, even if they are interrelated. In addition, disaggrega-
tion of the available data on health care costs, revealing both what
is known and what is not known, is an important preliminary step
in developing a more sophisticated understanding of the reality of
the cost problems of the 1980's and should serve as an introduction
to the other articles in this Symposium.
Obviously, rising health care costs deserve our individual and
21. As one commentator has phrased it, "these serious questions have been engaged in a
context marked by passion, pathos, and publicity." Englehardt, Shattuck Lecture-Allocat-
ing Scarce Medical Resources and the Availability of Organ Transplantation: Some Moral
Presuppositions, 311 NEw ENG. J. MED. 66 (1984).
22. Examples of the role of the media (and critical analysis thereof) are ABC News,
June 6, 1983; CBS News, Feb. 16, 1985; -2 AMA Officials Deplore Publicity in Heart Sur-
gery Experiments," N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1984, at A18, col. 2; "Girl Dies in Her 2nd Opera-
tion for Heart-Liver Transplant," N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1985, at A28, col. 1.
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collective attention, but the nature of the "fundamental problem"
and its implications for the various actors and institutions affected
by health care costs is neither intuitively obvious nor easily as-
sessed. Inquiry into the various health care cost-containment di-
lemmas, therefore, should be as informed as possible. Perhaps most
important, the various implications of rising health care costs
should be viewed against a backdrop of the political environment in
which these problems will be defined, their implications assessed,
and their resolutions attempted. The reality of the need for-and
prospects for-health care cost containment in the 1980's lies both
in an analysis of the technically derived data concerning health care
expenditures and in an understanding of the public's perceptions, of
the political power of providers and other interest groups, and of
the influence of prevailing social and political circumstances.
II. THE "FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM:" THE RISING COSTS OF
HEALTH CARE TO THE ECONOMY
Viewed in the aggregate, the costs of health care in this country
are extraordinarily expensive. According to the most reliable gov-
ernment estimates, national health expenditures (NHEs) exceeded
$425 billion in 1985, 10.7% of the gross national product (GNP).23
Personal health services, roughly the equivalent of individual medi-
cal care, accounted for approximately 90% of this total.24 Several
comparisons, as illustrated by Table 1, highlight the growing impor-
tance and problematic character of these expenditures for the
American economy.
23. These estimates for 1985 are preliminary and unpublished as of September 1986.
U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Press Release (July 29, 1986). For most recent
published data, see Levit, Lazenby, Waldo & Davidoff, National Health Expenditures, 1984, 7
HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Fall 1985, at 1 [hereinafter cited as 1984 EXPENDITURES]. The
annual summaries of national health expenditures published by the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) have become the most reliable and the most often cited estimates of
national spending. Note, however, that the data are generally derived from other sources,
such as annual surveys of its membership by the American Hospital Association, and rely
heavily on the accuracy of various technical assumptions. For an explanation, see Freeland
& Schendler, National Health Expenditure Growth in the 1980's: An Aging Population, New
Technologies, and Increasing Competition, 4 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Spr. 1983, at 1.
24. "Personal health care" is defined as the direct provision of care and consists of phy-
sicians' services, hospital and nursing care, drugs, eyeglasses, dentists' services, and other
appliances and professional services. See Gibson, Levit, Lazenby & Waldo, National Health
Expenditures, 1983, 6 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Winter 1984, at 7 [hereinafter cited as 1983
EXPENDITURES].
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TABLE 1
AGGREGATE NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES 1929-1985
ANNUAL
YEAR NHE GROWTH RATE % TOTAL
(in billions) (%) of NHE GNP
1990 $ 690 12.3%
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969
1968
1967
1966
1965
1960
1955
1950
1940
1929
(425)
387
355
321
285
248
215
190
170
151
133
116
103
94
84
75
66
58
52
46
42
27
18
13
4
4
(8.9)%
9.1
10.6
12.6
15.2
13.3
13.2
11.7
12.9
13.6
12.1
12.5
10.0
12.5
11.4
13.4
12.7
13.1
10.8
10.3
9.3
5.3
7.0
12.2
0.8
(10.7)
10.6
10.7
10.5
9.6
9.4
8.9
8.8
8.9
8.8
8.6
8.1
7.8
7.9
7.7
7.6
7.0
6.7
6.4
6.1
6.1
5.3
4.4
4.4
4.0
3.5
SOURCE: Gibson, Levit, Lazenby & Waldo, National Health Expenditures, 1983, HEALTH
CARE FIN. REV., Winter 1984, Table 1, at 3. Modified by U.S. DEPT. OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH UNITED STATES 1985 (1985), Table
80, at 128. 1990 projection from Freeland & Schendler, Health Spending in the
1980's, HEALTH CARE FIN. REv., Spr. 1984, Table D, at 7. (1985 data are
preliminary estimates).
First of all, NHEs have been dramatically and steadily increas-
ing for at least forty years, in both absolute and relative terms.25 In
1950, essentially the eve of the technological revolution in modem
25. See supra Table 1.
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medicine,2 6 Americans were spending $12.7 billion annually for
their health care, 4.4% of the nation's GNP.27 What followed was
several decades of continually increasing growth. NHEs increased
at an average annual rate of over 8% per year through the 1960's,
accelerated to an average annual growth rate of 12% after the im-
plementation of Medicaid and Medicare and through the mid-
1970's, and grew by an average rate of over 13% from 1975 to
1983.28 More important, as Figure 1 shows, this accelerating
growth rate for NHEs, with only a few exceptions, 29 continually
exceeded the annual growth in the rest of the economy.
Thus, as early as 1972, with NHEs "only" $94 billion and de-
manding 7.9% of the GNP, annual health expenditures were de-
scribed as "staggering" and "unbelievable," and projections into the
future were inspiring predictions of "crisis" from a wide range of
health policy critics.30 Nonetheless, each year the unbelievable be-
came the believable as the mathematics of compounded percentage
increases pushed NHEs over $200 billion in 1979 and quickly over
$300 billion by 1982 and, each year, to even greater proportions of
the GNP.
Between 1982 and 1985, the annual rate of increase in NHEs
was somewhat reduced, representing, perhaps, a moderation of the
long-term trend of rapid growth.3 NHEs increased in 1984 by only
9.1% to $387 billion, the lowest rate of increase in twenty-five
years, reducing the proportion of the GNP spent on health care to
10.6% from 10.7% in 1983.32 Preliminary estimates for 1985
spending indicate that NHEs rose to $425 billion, 10.7% of the
GNP.33
26. See S. WILLIAMS & P. TORRENS, INTRODUCTION TO HEALTH SERVICES 3-12
(1980).
27. See supra Table 1.
28. See 1983 EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 3, 19.
29. Prior to 1984, the rate of growth of NHEs had exceeded the growth of the GNP in
all but two of the prior twenty-five years: 1973 and 1978. See supra Table 1; P. FELDSTEIN,
supra note 17, at 228. The 1973 wage and price control program under the Nixon Adminis-
tration has been cited as responsible for the reduced growth in 1973. See Wing & Silton,
supra note 13. The similar trend in 1978 occurred during the Carter Administration and has
been traced to the initial (and then disappearing) effect of the so-called "Voluntary Effort."
See P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 17, at 228, 245. For a discussion of the 1984 growth rate, see
infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
30. See R. Nixon, Special Message to the Congress Proposing a National Health Strat-
egy, 1971 PUB. PAPERS 170 (Feb. 18, 1971). Cf R. CARLSON, THE END OF MEDICINE
(1972). See also sources cited supra note 1.
31. See supra Table 1; 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 1-2, 6-8.
32. See supra Table 1; 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 3.
33. See supra note 23. Projections based on earlier data were made in 1985, estimating
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FIGURE 1
GROWTH IN NHE COMPARED TO GROWTH IN GNP, 1965-
1984
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SOURCE: Adapted from Levit, Lazenby, Waldo & Davidoff, National Health Expenditures, 1984,
HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Fall 1985, at 1, and U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV-
ICES, HEALTH UNITED STATES 1985 (1985), Table 80, at 128.
These most recent data cast some doubt on the accuracy of fu-
ture predictions, but some experts have charted the growth of
NHEs through the 1990's to well over $800 billion annually-over
12% of the GNP-and beyond then to even greater demands on the
nation's economy.34 But even if these latest spending statistics do
signal some slowing in the rate of growth of total spending, it is
clear, nonetheless, that NHEs have already grown at a rapid rate
for at least four decades, have continually grown faster than the rest
of the economy, and have, therefore, represented a sizable and vir-
tually relentless shifting of economic resources from other goods
and services to the purchase of health care." International compar-
that NHEs would be nearly $420 billion in 1985, 10.5% of the GNP. See Arnett, Cowell,
Davidoff & Freeland, Health Spending Trends in the 1980"s Adjusting to Financial Incentives,
6 HEALTH CARE FIN. REv., Spr. 1985, at 8 [hereinafter cited as HEALTH SPENDING
TRENDS].
34. See id.; see also Freeland & Schendler, supra note 23, at 4.
35. See P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 17, at 1-4.
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isons reveai similar trends in most other industrialized countries,
but, at least in the last ten years, in no other economy has the level
of spending for health care or the rate of its growth matched that of
the United States.36
Whether this represents a problem of fundamental importance,
however, is a matter of some debate, particularly since the growth
rate of health care costs has slowed somewhat in the last few years.
To some extent this rapid growth in NHEs and the consequent
shifting of economic resources during the last several decades was
predictable. The rapid growth of NHEs virtually coincided with
the equally rapid development of modem medical technology, al-
lowing American medicine to treat, and treat more intensively, a
variety of ills and conditions in unprecedented ways. To oversim-
plify, there is much more medical care to purchase in 1987 than
there was in 1950. Although not as marked as in earlier years, there
has even been some expansion of medical capabilities in the last dec-
ade, affecting the available supply of medical services.37
In addition, the American population has grown during this pe-
riod of NHE growth,38 and, particularly in the last decade, the age
composition of that population has changed. 39 Elderly Americans
now represent a much larger proportion of the population, who,
while healthier than their earlier counterparts, still need and use
more medical care than their younger contemporaries. Recent data
indicate that the average spending on the elderly is as much as three
and one-half times that of the rest of the population," with spend-
ing on the growing number of the "very old" even higher.41 It is
also generally accepted in the economic literature that, as an econ-
omy "matures," consumers have more resources to spend and tend
to spend more of their discretionary resources on medical care and
related services.42 Indeed, a few critics have attempted to argue
that there is nothing inherently wrong with a "mature economy" or
a wealthy society spending 12%, 15% or, for that matter, 20% of
its economic output on health care, if that is what consumers want
36. See Freeland & Schendler, supra note 23, at 6-7; Reinhardt, Can the United States
Learn from Foreign Medical Insurance Systems?, 59 Hosp. PROGRESS, Nov. 1978, at 60.
37. See 49 Fed. Reg. 252, 338 (1984).
38. See HEALTH SPENDING TRENDS, supra note 33, at 1.
39. See Freeland & Schendler, supra note 23, at 40.
40. See Waldo & Lazenby, supra note 18, at 1.
41. See Soldo & Manton, Changes in the Health Status and Service Needs of the Oldest
Old: Current Patterns and Future Trends, 63 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 286, 291
(1985).
42. See P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 17, at 81, 87.
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to purchase with their available wealth.43
Thus, in the politically sanitized lingo of economics, both the
demand for health services and the supply of those services have
increased over the last forty years as a fairly understandable re-
sponse to changes in technology, in economic and social conditions,
and in a variety of other factors.' A consequent increase in total
health expenditures and some shifting of economic resources, there-
fore, may not necessarily represent a social or political problem, or
at least one that requires immediate reversal or containment. But
while these factors have been and will continue to be influential,45
their relative contribution to increases in NHEs-particularly dur-
ing the 1980's-should not be misunderstood or overstated, nor
should they be weighed too heavily in formulating contemporary
health policy.
As the estimates in Figure 2 indicate, growth in the population
has been responsible for some of the growth in health spending, at a
remarkably constant yet relatively small rate: between 6-11% an-
nually during the period from 1968 to 1984.
Of greater importance has been the proportion of spending in-
creases that can be attributed to the "intensity" of services, meaning
both the higher rates of utilization of health care services and the
greater number of services being rendered to each patient per visit
or episode-more diagnostic tests, more complicated (and expen-
sive) procedures, or longer institutional stays for a given illness.46 If
these estimates are correct, however, the proportion of health
spending increases attributable to changes in "intensity" has been
declining over time. Changes in "intensity" represented almost
50% of the annual increases in health care spending in the 1960's
and early 1970's, but decreased to less than 20% of the annual in-
creases by 1980. 4 1 Estimates for the most recent years indicate that
the causal role of changes in "intensity" is even smaller. 48 This is
clearly at odds with the popular notions that rising health care costs
43. See, eg., Ginzberg & Ostow, Organization and Financing of Medical Care Resources,
23 MED. CARE 421, 423-24 (1985); E. GINZBERG, AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE POWER
SHIFr 145-46 (1985).
44. See P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 17, at 1-4, 49-53, 77-81, 89-93, 99-105.
45. See infra notes 116-38 and accompanying text.
46. See HEALTH SPENDING TRENDS, supra note 33, at 7-10.
47. See infra Figure 2.
48. For 1983, HCFA estimated that changes in "other factors" (including "intensity"
and other minor influences) were responsible for 19% of the increase in personal health ex-
penditures. (Note that Figure 2 relates to total NHEs.) See 1983 EXPENDITURES, supra note
24, at 9. For 1984, similar estimates show a decline to 13% for "other factors." See 1984
EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 8.
1986]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
FIGURE 2
FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR NHE INCREASES, 1968-1984
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SOURCE: U.S. Drt-r. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH UNITED STATES 1985 (1985),
Table 81. at 129.
are caused by today's Americans living longer, or demanding un-
limited or unnecessary medical care, or by other factors relating to
more use of more services. Indeed, these data indicate that histori-
cally the relative importance of "intensity" has been declining, even
during the period when health spending was increasing at its high-
est annual rates.49
These estimates also indicate that the greatest share of increases
in health care spending, particularly in the last ten years, can be
attributed to price inflation, meaning inflation in the generally ac-
cepted economic sense: increases in what economists call "inputs,"
or increases in the cost of "inputs," for what are regarded as essen-
tially the same goods or services." As Figure 2 shows, about two-
thirds of the increases in total health spending by 1975 could be
traced to price inflation. Since that time, the proportion of spending
49. See supra Table 1.
50. See P. FEI.DSTEIN, supra note 17, at 54-64, 224-44. For a full explanation of how
price inflation is estimated, see Freeland & Schendler, supra note 23, at 7-10.
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increases that can be attributed to price inflation has steadily in-
creased, representing nearly 80% of the total annual increase in
health spending in the most recent years.51
Thus, inflation-not intensity or population growth-has been
the leading causal factor in the historic growth of NHEs. Inflation
is a factor of continuing and growing importance, an observation of
crucial significance in both defining the exact nature of the "funda-
mental problem," and in evaluating the need for and the nature of
appropriate remedial responses. Americans are essentially paying
more for their medical care in the most literal sense; indeed, the
latest estimates indicate that they may be paying more and receiving
slightly less.5 2
This price inflation, of course, has been driven in large part by
the inflation in the economy in general, but it also represents a
higher level of inflation in health care prices that is specific to health
care services. In 1983, 44% of the increase in personal health ex-
penditures was attributable to economy-wide inflation. 3 In 1984,
despite a slowing of the economy, that figure had increased to
52%.14 In both years, approximately one-fourth of the total in-
crease was an additional industry-specific price inflation.55 As mea-
sured by the Medical Care Price Index (MCPI),5 6 price inflation in
national health care spending during the last twenty years has con-
tinually and significantly exceeded the Consumer Price Index
(CPI), the generally accepted measure of inflation in the general
economy. 7 As Figure 3 shows, the annual percent change in the
MCPI during the last two decades has- with some notable excep-
tions 8 -consistently exceeded the increase in the CPI, in some
years growing at twice the rate of the CPI. This trend was sus-
51. Estimates for 1984 indicate that inflation was responsible for 76% of the increase in
personal health expenditures. (Note that this is personal health expenditures and not total
NHEs.) See 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 8. In 1982 and 1983, inflation was
responsible for 70% of the increase. See 1983 EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 6, 9. During
the prior decade, inflation was responsible for approximately 57% of the increase. See
HEALTH SPENDING TRENDS, supra note 33, at 10.
52. See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
53. See 1983 EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 9.
54. See 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 8.
55. See id.; 1983 EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 9.
56. See infra Figure 3. For a technical definition of MCPI, the medical care component
of the Consumer Price Index, see P. FItI.Ds-ruIN, supra note 17, at 54.
57. For a technical definition of the consumer price index, the primary barometer of the
national inflation rate for the consumer economy maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, see P. F-sT.IsrTEIN, supra note 17, at 45-53.
58. Only in 1979 and 1980 was the CPI (slightly) higher than the MCPI. Most experts
have attributed this to the peculiar economics of those years and, in part, to the effects of the
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tained even during years when the inflation in the general economy
itself was regarded as reaching critical levels.59
FIGURE 3
CHANGE IN MCPI VS CHANGE IN CPI
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SOURE: U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH UNITED STATES 1985 (1985),
Table 77, at 125.
No other major item in the economy-food, housing, transpor-
tation, even energy costs- has matched these levels of specific-price
inflation.60 Thus, during the last two decades and, most important,
during the last ten years (the period of the greatest increases in the
costs of health care), Americans have been paying higher prices for
their medical care due to a rate of inflation that cannot be explained
so-called "Voluntary Effort" of providers. See P. Fi'I.DSTHiN, supra note 17, at 228; Wing &
Silton, supra note 11, at 1431, n.41.
59. For further discussion and projections into the next decade, see HE.ALTH SPENDING
TRE.NDS, supra note 33, at 3-9.
60. See P. FIoA)sIN, supra note 17, at 53, HE.AITH INSURANCEi ASSOCIATION 01:
AMEiRICA, SOURCI BOOK OF HIAI:I'H INSURANCF. DATA 1984-85 56 (1985) [hereinafter
cited as HIAA].
- % Change in MCPI
- % Change in CPI
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simply by reference to prevailing economic conditions or other miti-
gating factors.
A relevant economic, as well as political, lesson can be learned
from an analysis of the cost data for the last several years, when,
ironically, the "fundamental problem" was somewhat obscured by
the apparent decline in the rate of increase in NHEs.61 In 1984,
growth of NHEs was slightly less than that of the general econ-
omy, 6z and government reports63 and media accounts were herald-
ing a slowing in the rate of health care "inflation."'  But, in fact,
the long-term trend of price inflation, driven both by inflation gen-
erally and by the inflation specific to health services, was continuing
to influence health care spending at a relatively high level. The rate
of increase in total NHEs in 1984 was slightly lower than the per-
centage growth of the GNP only because the rate of productivity of
health services declined and was significantly lower than that for
the rest of the economy.65 The MCPI was still 6.2%-150% of the
rate of general price inflation, as measured by the CPI. 66 Although
this was a relative decline compared to 1983, when the MCPI was
twice the rate of the CPI,67 Americans were still paying more and,
perhaps, receiving slightly less, even if health care spending was not
publicly perceived as a growing and persistent problem. 8
This isolation of the dominant and continuing role of price infla-
tion in health care costs is not meant to suggest that other factors
that have contributed to the growth of NHEs, or to the shifting of
economic resources, should be disregarded in evaluating either his-
61. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text; Table 1.
62. Growth in NHEs was 9.1% in 1984. Growth of the general economy was 10.8%.
The percentage of GNP representing health care spending dipped slightly from 10.7% to
10.6%. See supra Table 1; 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 3.
63. In a July 31, 1985, nevs release, then Secretary of Health and Human Services Mar-
garet M. Heckler announced that "It]his dramatic decrease in health care inflation is contin-
ued good news for Americans .... Health care providers are increasingly giving more
efficient service." (A copy is on file at the School of Law, University of North Carolina).
Both assertions by Secretary Heckler-that inflation had decreased and that providers were
more efficient-were patently contradicted by the data included in the news release.
64. See, eg., N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1985, at 1-15.
65. In 1984, various measures of inputs (e.g., employment, work hours) decelerated
markedly from previous years and were estimated at only one-half of the historic rates from
the previous decades. See 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 7. Output growth slowed
as well; in fact, after controlling for inflation, personal health expenditures grew only 2.1% in
1984. The average rate between 1965 and 1983 was nearly 5%. Id. at 8. See also infra notes
85-89, 105-07, and accompanying text for a discussion of utilization rates for various services.
66. See 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 8.
67. See id.
68. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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toric trends or the need for cost containment. Changes in
demographics, in the patterns of utilization or service, or in our so-
cial or economic circumstances will continue to have an influential
impact on NHEs. Some experts, for example, have warned that the
"graying" of the American population will become one of the domi-
nant factors contributing to future increases in health spending,
particularly towards the end of this century.69 Conversely, induced
or incidental changes in such factors as "intensity" (e.g., a reduc-
tion in the rate of hospitalization) can contribute to the containment
of rising health care costs, even if they do so only by disguising the
influence of price inflation or of other factors, as the data for the
most recent years apparently demonstrate.70 But such short-term
success notwithstanding, the health care cost problem of the 1980's,
the one that appears to have the most significant economic conse-
quences and the one that has not been contained in any realistic
sense, is price inflation. Price inflation, driven by inflation in the
economy but continually exceeding that level of inflation-not
"staggering" levels of aggregate spending, a growing or aging popu-
lation, or significant increases in demand-is the most problematic
characteristic of contemporary American health care, at least when
viewed in terms of its impact on the economy.
Before further examining either the policy implications of our
present circumstances or the political prospects for health care cost
containment, whether through modification of price inflation or any
other means, it is important to supplement as well as qualify some
of the observations made above by examining in more detail the
expenditures associated with specific categories of health services.
A. Expenditures for Hospital Services
Tracking virtually the same long-term course as total NHEs, ag-
gregate spending for hospital services rapidly increased from $10.9
billion in 1950 to $158 billion in 1984,71 averaging nearly a 14%
increase per year from 1965 to 1983.72 In the last several years, the
growth of hospital expenditures has somewhat slowed, again paral-
leling the growth of total NHEs. In 1983, total spending was $147
billion, an increase of 10.5% over the previous year.7 3 Expenditures
69. See generally S. CRYSTAL, AMERICA'S OLD AGE CRISIS (1982); Waldo & Lazenby,
supra note 18, at 1; Fuchs, supra note 18, at 143.
70. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
71. See infra Table 2; 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 9, 12.
72. See infra Table 2.
73. See infra Table 2; 1983 EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 9.
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grew by 6.1% in 1984, the slowest increase since 1965'4 and a rate
significantly lower than the growth of total NHEs-clearly one of
the most significant developments in recent years.
Notwithstanding the apparent trend of the last several years,
Table 2 shows that spending for hospital services during the last
forty years has, with a few interesting exceptions, increased rapidly
and measurably faster than the rest of the economy, as measured by
GNP growth.7" Growth of hospital spending has also generally ex-
ceeded the growth rate of total health care expenditures, 76 reaching
its highest rate of growth during a decade when utilization of hospi-
tal services began to decline, as discussed more fully below.77
FIGURE 4
PROPORTION OF NHE BY CATEGORY
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SOURCE: Calculated from Levit, Lazenby, Waldo & Davidoff, National Health Expenditures. 1984,
HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Fall 1985, Table 2, at 9.
74. See 1984 EXPENDITURI-S, supra note 23, at 12.
75. The exceptions are 1978 and 1973. See supra note 29.
76. See supra Table 1. Growth of NHEs exceeded annual growth of hospital expendi-
tures in 1971, 1977, 1983, and 1984. All tolled, however, hospital spending has increased in
the last 20 years by 1127%, compared to a 924% increase in NHEs. See 1984 EXPENDI-
TURIFS, supra note 23, at 3, 9.
77. See infra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 2
GROWTH RATES PER ANNUM (%)
NURSING
YEAR HOSPITALS DOCTORS HOMES GNP
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969
1968
1967
1966
1965
1960
1955
1950
6.1%
10.5
14.2
16.4
16.4
14.2
11.9
11.8
16.2
16.4
15.7
10.5
13.5
10.7
15.7
14.7
14.7
16.5
12.9
10.3
10.3
10.1
10.2%
10.7
12.8
17.1
16.4
12.3
12.2
15.6
10.8
17.5
11.0
11.0
8.2
11.2
13.5
13.5
9.9
9.8
8.2
8.3
8.9%
9.3
12.6
17.2
17.2
15.2
16.2
15.0
11.9
18.8
18.1
10.8
16.1
19.1
23.7
11.8
21.4
16.7
14.3
10.8%
7.7
3.8
12.4
8.8
11.7
12.8
11.7
10.9
8.0
8.1
11.8
10.0
8.6
5.2
8.1
9.2
5.8
9.4
6.4
4.8
6.9
11.1
SOURCE: Hospital, doctor and nursing home rates for 1966-1984 calculated using data
from Gibson, Levit, Lazenby & Waldo, National Health Expenditures, 1983,
HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Winter 1984, Table 2, at 7, and Levit, Lazenby,
Waldo & Davidoff, National Health Expenditures, 1984, HEALTH CARE FIN.
REV., Fall 1985, Table 2, at 9. Hospital and doctor rates for 1955-1960 from P.
FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECONOMics, Table 10-7, at 227, and Table 9-2, at
175 (2d ed. 1983). GNP rates from Gibson, Levit, Lazenby & Waldo, National
Health Expenditures, 1983, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Winter 1984, Table 1, at
3, and Levit, Lazenby, Waldo & Davidoff, National Health Expenditures, 1984,
HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Fall 1985, Table 1, at 3.
The importance of this growth in hospital expenditures in defin-
ing health policy issues is reflected in Figure 4.78 Historically, hos-
pital spending has been the largest portion of the national health
budget. That share has steadily grown over the last four decades; in
the most recent years, hospital services have commanded over one-
half of all spending for personal health services and over 40% of
78. See also P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 17, at 224-34.
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NHEs.79 In 1984, hospital services accounted for 46% of all spend-
ing for personal health services, and just over 40% of all spending.8"
Perhaps more critical from a policy perspective, hospital expendi-
tures have represented even higher proportions of total government
expenditures, as discussed more fully in the next section.8 1 More-
over, these figures represent only direct hospital charges. If physi-
cian charges to hospitalized patients, spending for separately billed
procedures, and rehabilitation following hospitalization were in-
eluded, total spending associated with hospitalization would repre-
sent over 80% of all health spending.82 Given this dominant role
of the hospital in modem American medicine, the analysis of the
underlying causes of the growth in hospital expenditures becomes
critically important for evaluating both the reality of the need for
cost containment and the appropriate responses to that need.
As with increases in total health care spending, price inflation
apparently has played a primary and continuing role in the growth
of expenditures for hospital services, even as the rate of increase in
total spending has begun to moderate in recent years. Indeed, the
role of price inflation in rising expenditures for hospital services in
the last decade has been particularly dominant, since utilization of
hospital services during that time apparently leveled off, and, in the
most recent years, even declined according to some measures.8
3
Data collected from community hospitals,84 as shown in Table
3, indicate that the average length of stay historically was increasing
until the early 1970's. That rate declined in the next several years
and remained fairly constant through 1983. In 1984, the average
length of stay in community hospitals dropped to 7.3 days, the low-
est rate ever recorded.85 Some experts have predicted a continuing
79. See 1983 EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 7.
80. See 1984 EXPENDrrURE, supra note 23, at 12; supra Figure 4.
81. In 1984, government spending accounted for 53% of all hospital expenditures. See
1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 12. In the past 10 years, this figure has been fairly
stable, although the federal share has gradually increased. See infra notes 149, 163, 166, and
accompanying text.
82. See P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 17, at 3.
83. For a general discussion of the role of price inflation in hospital spending, see id. at
62-63. For a discussion of price inflation in most recent years, see 1984 EXPENDITURES,
supra note 23, at 12. See also HEALTH SPENDING TRENDS, supra note 33, at 18-19.
84. Community hospitals represent over 90% of all short-term, acute-care hospitals.
While this does not represent all hospitals, the experience of community hospitals is generally
regarded as representative of the experience of the entire hospital industry. For a discussion
of community hospitals and their characteristics, see Wing & Craige, Health Care Regulation:
Dilemma of a Partially Developed Public Policy, 57 N.C.L. REv. 1165, 1172 (1979).
85. See 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 13; but see infra note 182 for data on
people over age 65.
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decline in the next several years.86
TABLE 3
COMMUNITY HOSPITAL: Length of Stay, Admissions, and Costs
AVERAGE LENGTH AVERAGE COST ADMISSIONS
YEAR OF HOSPITAL TO HOSPITAL PER BED
STAY IN DAYS PER PT. STAY PER YEAR
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969
1968
1967
1966
1965
1964
1963
1962
1961
1960
1955
1950
N/A
$2789.18
2488.20
2160.70
1862.80
1651.50
1476.70
1322.40
1168.90
1030.30
886.10
798.70
831.70
738.48
664.28
581.25
515.59
448.86
380.39
346.94
320.17
299.61
279.91
265.85
244.95
180.34
126.52
N/A
154.4
156.7
161.9
165.8
162.4
161.1
161.4
160.5
159.2
157.8
153.2
150.0
148.2
145.6
138.8
129.2
117.3
111.4
SOURCE: HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH
INSURANCE DATA 1984-1985 (1985), Table 5.15, at 57, and Table 6.8, at 73.
1984 data from AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, HOSPITAL STATISTICS
xvii (1985).
The rate of admission to hospitals grew moderately through the
1970's but has declined rather markedly in the 1980's,87 although
86. Recent predictions estimate that the average length of stay in hospitals will continue
to decline into the next decade. See HEALTH SPENDING TRENDS, supra note 33, at 19; Free-
land & Schendler, supra note 23, at 19.
87. A 1984 survey of community hospitals indicated that inpatient admissions declined
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the rate of admissions for outpatient services has increased in the
most recent years.88 During this time, there has been no increase in
the number of hospital beds or any other indication that either a
change in the supply of hospital services or in the utilization of
those services has been primarily responsible for the rapid growth in
hospital expenditures during the 1970's, or in the continuing but
moderated rate of increase in the 1980's.19 One expert estimated
that from 1966 to 1980, less than 13% of the increase in hospital
expenditures could be attributed to either increased utilization or
increases in population. 9° The remaining 87% was attributable to
sizable increases in expenditures per patient day of service, reflect-
ing either inflation in the prices of hospital services or increases in
the "intensity" of the services rendered to each patient.
Unfortunately, segregating price inflation from "intensity" in
the hospital context is a particularly difficult task,91 confounded by
some peculiar characteristics of American hospital care, not the
least of which are the significant variations in utilization rates of
hospital services from state to state, and even within the same
state-variations for which no satisfactory explanation is avail-
able.92 But even given this complication, it is fairly clear that price
inflation, driven by inflation in the general economy but represent-
ing a rate of inflation specific to hospital services that is higher than
that of the general economy, has played and continues to play a
primary role in rising expenditures for hospital services.
As Figure 5 illustrates, estimates for the decade from 1973 to
1983 indicate that increases in the intensity of service per admission
were responsible for less than 25% of the increase in total hospital
expenditures. Roughly 65% of the increase during this period can
be attributed to inflation, 50% of which was inflation in the general
economy, and 15% due to an additional hospital-specific price
inflation.93
1.4 million, down 3.7% from 1983. Total inpatient days also declined 22.7 million, a drop of
8.6% from 1983. See 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 12-13.
88. See id.; HIAA, supra note 60, at 66.
89. See P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 17, at 230-31 (analyzing the 1970's). If anything, the
supply of hospital beds has been shrinking slightly in recent years. See 1984 EXPENDITURES,
supra note 23, at 13.
90. See P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 17, at 230; Freeland & Schendler, supra note 23.
91. See P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 17, at 224-233.
92. See id. at 224-25; U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH
UNITED STATES 1985, at 142-43 (1985) [hereinafter cited as HEALTH U.S. 1985]. This is
apparently true for other services. See P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 17, at 82-86, 140-41.
93. See HEALTH SPENDING TRENDS, supra note 33, at 18-19.
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FIGURE 5
COMMUNITY HOSPITAL INPATIENT CARE
EXPENDITURE GROWTH FACTORS, 1973-1983
Population
6.7% Price Increases in
Excess of Inflation- 34.5%
14.6%
-Admissions Per Capita- 10.3%
Inflation . 50.9%
23.4% Intensity Per 55.2%
Admissions
All Factors Service Related
Factors Only
SOURCE: Arnett, Cowell, Davidoff & Freeland, Health Spending Trends In The 1980"s. Adjusting To
Financial Incentives, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Spr. 1985, Table 7, at 18.
Data for 1983 indicate that the role of intensity per admission in
increasing expenditures was less than 16%. 91 Over 75% of the
1983 increase was due to inflation, 50% from inflation in the gen-
eral economy and 25% from hospital price inflation over and above
general inflation.95 The role of inflation moderated somewhat in
1984; 44% of the increase in expenditures was a result of general
inflation, an additional 16% from hospital-specific inflation.96
The implications of these data are confirmed by other estimates
of the rate of increase of hospital price inflation. As measured by
average room rate increases, hospital price inflation was 11.4% in
1983, when the MCPI was 8.7% and the CPI was 3.2%. In
1984, hospital price inflation was only 8.7%, the first time that fig-
ure has dropped below double digits in nearly twenty years. None-
theless, this rate of hospital price inflation still exceeded the MCPI
by wide margins and was still nearly twice the rate of the CPI for
1984.98
Assuming these data have correctly isolated the causal factors
94. See 1983 EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 9.
95. See id.
96. See 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 12.
97. See HEALTH U.S. 1985, supra note 92, at 127; supra Figure 3.
98. In 1984, the MCPI was estimated at 6.2%. The CPI was estimated at 4.3%. See
HEALTH U.S. 1985, supra note 92, at 127; supra Figure 3.
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behind rising hospital expenditures during the last decade and, most
critical, during the most recent years, it appears that price inflation,
not other factors, has been the driving force behind hospital spend-
ing increases. The price inflation problem for hospital spending in
the 1980's is somewhat less problematic than it was in the 1970's.
The influence of other factors, such as utilization and intensity in-
creases, has been reduced; in fact, hospital utilization has appar-
ently declined. Inflation in the general economy has also
moderated. Indeed, the hospital industry in most recent years has
frequently attempted to claim the same "success" in controlling
"inflation" that some federal policymakers have tried to claim.99
But even if the problematic character of inflation is moderated or
disguised, hospital prices have been, and continue to be, inflating at
a rate higher than general inflation. They will, therefore, continue
to have detrimental economic consequences and continue to deserve
the public's concern. From a policy point of view, if there is a cost
problem associated with hospital expenditures that deserves atten-
tion in the 1980's, it appears that both the definition of that problem
and the design of remedial solutions should focus on inflation as
much as, if not more than, other contributing factors.
B. Expenditures for Physician Services
The data on aggregate spending for physician services indicate
similar growth trends as those for hospital services; they also con-
firm the primary influence of price inflation in increasing health
care costs.
As with other health care expenditures, spending for physician
services has steadily increased during the last forty years, growing
from $2.7 billion in total spending in 1950 to $14 billion in 1965 to
$75.4 billion in 1984.1°° The rate of this growth has also paralleled
that of other health expenditures. As illustrated by Table 2, the rate
of growth accelerated through the mid-1970's and peaked at over
17% per year in 1975. Overall, it grew at a much higher rate than
the GNP, although the rate of growth was much more variable than
that of hospital or other services. In most recent years, however,
99. At the same time that the federal government was announcing that "inflation" in
health expenditures for 1984 had been reduced, see supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text,
the hospital literature was implying that the hospital industry was forging a similar victory.
See, e:g., Hospital Rate of Increase Continues Under 5%, HHA i:l't L. VicIli., May 31, 1985, at
5; Hospital Expenses Continue Moderate Rise, Hi.AI:rH L. ViGli., Oct. 18, 1985, at 9-10.
Note that both articles discuss the decline in the utilization of services but omit reference to
the cost of a unit of service or the continuation of price inflation.
100. See 1984 ExPI.NIrrURFS, supra note 23, at 9.
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this rate of growth has somewhat moderated; physician expendi-
tures grew 10.7% in 1983101 and only 10.2% in 1984, somewhat
higher than the growth in total NHEs and slightly below the
growth in the GNP. t °2
As Figure 4 indicates, these physician expenditures represented
a slightly declining proportion of health care spending until the
mid-1970's. Since that time, they have demanded a relatively con-
stant and, to some observers, relatively small share of total spend-
ing, averaging between 20 and 25% of spending for personal health
services. 10 3 But in addition to their direct costs, the services of phy-
sicians also indirectly affect the total costs of health care. Virtually
all other medical care, most notably services in hospitals and other
institutions, is ordered or prescribed by a physician, usually incident
to the delivery of some direct service."° The proprietization of hos-
pital care and the modest growth in recent years of alternative deliv-
ery systems may somewhat dilute the traditional autonomy of
physicians; their role in determining who gets what kind and what
level of service may be thereby reduced. But the physician's role in
determining the utilization and "intensity" of all services-and con-
sequently the cost of those services-should be considered as impor-
tant as the direct costs of physician services in evaluating the need
for cost containment and the appropriate remedial responses.
As with hospital expenditures and expenditures for most other
health services, the rate of growth of physician expenditures cannot
be explained by the rate of growth of the population or, more im-
portant, by increases in the utilization of physician services, particu-
larly in the last decade.0 5 Available data indicate that physician
visits per person have been remarkably constant over the last thirty
years, even following the enactment of Medicaid and Medicare. 10 6
With few exceptions, there has been little change in the rate of phy-
sician utilization during the last decade, the period of highest
growth of physician expenditures, as illustrated by Table 4."° 7
101. See 1983 EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 6. In the decade prior to 1983, the
average increase was 14%. See HEALTH SPENDING TRENDS, supra note 33, at 19.
102. See 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 22, at 8; supra Tables 1 and 2. Experts have
predicted that the growth of spending for physician services may continue to decline into the
next decade. See HEALTH SPENDING TRENDS, supra note 33, at 19.
103. See P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 17, at 174.
104. Physicians may influence as much at 70% of all personal health spending. See id;
HEALTH SPENDING TRENDS, supra note 33, at 19.
105. See 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 11-12.
106. See P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 17, at 174; HIAA, supra note 60, at 66, 75.
107. See supra Table 2; infra Table 5.
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TABLE 4
NUMBER OF PHYSICIAN VISITS PER PERSON PER YEAR
AND NUMBER OF VISITS PER PHYSICIAN PER WEEK
Number of Visits Number of Visits
Year per Person per Year per MD per Week
1984
1983 5.0
1982 5.1
1981 4.6
1980 4.8 112.0
1979 4.7 122.7
1978 4.8 130.6
1977 4.8
1976 4.9 128.5
1975 5.1 126.5
1974 4.9 125.8
1973 5.0 137.7
1972 5.0
1971 4.9 135.8
1970 4.6 132.5
1969 4.3 126.9
1966-1967 4.3 124.1
1963-1964 4.5 -
1958-1959 4.7
SOURCE: 1958-1980 data from P. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE EcONOMICS (2d ed. 1983)
Table 9-3, at 176. 1981 data from U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV-
ICES, HEALTH UNITED STATES 1984 (1984), Table 42, at 97. 1982-1983 data
from U.S. DEPr. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH UNITED
STATES 1985 (1985), Table 43, at 82.
Estimates of the average number of visits per physician indicate
a similar trend: a fairly constant rate during the 1970's and a slight
decrease in the most recent years. 108 The leveling off of utilization
rates for hospital services in the last decade, obviously correlated
with the rate of physician services delivered in the hospital setting,
also contradicts the notion that an increase in physician utilization
is the driving force behind the continuing increases in total expendi-
tures for physician services.' 0 9
What has been steadily increasing during the last thirty years,
including the last decade, a decade characterized by decreasing
rates of utilization but steadily increasing physician expenditures,
has been the level of physician fees. As Table 5 indicates, the rate of
growth of physician fees increased through the 1970's and remained
108. See HEALTH U.S. 1985, supra note 92, at 82-86.
109. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 5
ANNUAL RATE OF CHANGE IN THE CPI AND
FEES, 1955-1984
IN PHYSICIAN
CPI All Items CPI All Services CPI
YEAR less Medical Care less Medical Care Physician Fees
1985 3.4% 5.0% 5.8%
1984 4.1 5.2 7.0
1983 2.9 2.9 7.7
1982 5.9 8.7 9.4
1981 10.3 13.4 11.0
1980 13.6 15.9 11.7
1979 11.4 11.2 9.2
1978 7.6 8.6 8.3
1977 6.2 7.3 9.3
1976 5.5 7.9 11.3
1975 8.9 9.1 12.3
1974 11.1 9.2 9.2
1973 6.4 4.3 3.3
1972 3.3 3.8 3.1
1971 4.1 5.3 6.9
1970 5.8 8.3 7.5
1969 5.4 6.8 6.9
1968 4.1 4.9 5.6
1967 2.4 3.7 7.1
1966 3.0 3.4 5.8
1960-1965 1.2 1.8 2.8
1955-1960 2.0 3.5 3.3
SOURCE: 1955-1981 from P. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS, Table 9-1, at 174
(2d ed. 1983) and 1982-1985 from BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR: CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, "All Urban Consumers"
index, various issues.
relatively high until the last several years, exceeding the overall
growth of the adjusted CPI for the economy during this period, as
well as that of the CPI for all services. In 1983, physician fees rose
7.7%, while the adjusted CPI increased 2.9%.l ° In 1984, price
inflation was again the significant contributor to the increase in phy-
sician expenditures, rising 7% while the adjusted CPI increased
only 4.1%.1 "
110. Note that the CPI estimates in Table 5 are adjusted to exclude the influences of
medical care increases. For comparison based on estimates of CPI for all items including
medical care for these same years, see 1983 EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, and Figure 3.
111. See 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 11-12. Again paralleling the growth of
hospital spending and health expenditures in general, it is clear that inflation has been the
dominant and continuing influence on physician spending increases. During the period from
1973 to 1983, it has been estimated that 56% of the total increase was due to general infla-
tion, while 17% was due to an additional price inflation specific to physician services. In-
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These data strongly suggest, therefore, that increasing physician
expenditures can be traced largely to inflation in the price of physi-
cian services. They also indicate that this inflation is due in sub-
stantial part to the inflation in the general economy, but also to a
higher level of inflation specific to physician services.' 12 Again,
there is some problem divorcing changes in the "intensity" of a phy-
sician service from the inflation in its price.113 The nature of the
services delivered by physicians may be changing in various re-
spects; moreover, the costs of providing the same "inputs" for the
service would be expected to change roughly at the rate of the CPI
or other indicators of general economic inflation. Nonetheless, the
inflation of physician fees has generally exceeded these expecta-
tions. 4 The studies that have attempted to compare actual ex-
penses of maintaining a physician practice also have confirmed that
the fees charged by physicians are rising faster than the increases in
the expenses associated with those fees.1 5 Thus, as with rising ex-
penditures for hospital services and for health expenditures in the
aggregate, if expenditures for physician services are considered
problematic, the major focus of attention should be on the continu-
ing inflation of the prices paid for these services.
C. Expenditures for Nursing Homes and Other Services
Notwithstanding the sizable portions of NHEs represented by
direct expenditures for hospital services and for physician services,
as well as the significant indirect effects of these expenditures on
total health spending, some attention should be given to the level of
spending for the variety of other health and health-related goods
and services that contribute to total health care costs. In 1984, for
example, nearly 20% of NHEs, 22% of all personal health services,
were spent for drugs, dental and other non-physician professional
services, medical supplies, eyeglasses, and other health appli-
ances." 6 Another 8% of NHEs were spent for nursing home serv-
creases in "intensity" accounted for another 26%. Population growth accounted for only
7%. The reduction in visits per patient resulted in a decrease of 6%. See HEALTH SPENDING
TRENDS, supra note 33, at 10.
112. See HEALTH SPENDING TRENDS, supra note 33, at 10, 18.
113. For estimates of the role of the "intensity" of physician services between 1973 and
1983, see id. at 10. For earlier years, see Freeland & Schendler, supra note 23, at 103.
114. See P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 17, at 173-78.
115. See id. In particular, see the analysis of long term trends in physicians' real income,
id. at 176.
116. See 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 9.
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ices, as discussed more fully below.11 7 "Medical sundries" and
drugs alone represented 7.5% of all personal health services in
1984.118
As Figure 4 indicates, the proportionate share of total health
spending for these other services has been growing slightly over the
last several decades, but, overall, the rate of growth of these expend-
itures has basically traced the same pattern as the growth of total
health expenditures: accelerating through the 1970's and growing
more slowly in recent years. 9 There is, however, considerable va-
riation within this category of spending. The rate of growth of
spending for prescription and over-the-counter drugs has been his-
torically slower than the growth of spending for other services and,
therefore, the share of total expenditures attributable to drugs has
steadily declined in the last three decades, unlike virtually any other
item in the health budget.12 0 Expenditures for dental services, on
the other hand, have had periods of remarkable growth in the last
decade. 121
One major reason for the differing rates of growth for these vari-
ous items is that unlike hospital services and physician services-for
which third-party coverage has been relatively stable in the last
twenty years-insurance and other third-party payment for these
"other services" historically has been rather limited.12 2 Thus, the
occasional extension of such coverage for one or more of these serv-
ices can prompt rapid increases in the rates of their utilization and,
consequently, the growth of their total expenditures. As a result,
examination of the causes of rising costs for these items, even in the
last decade, requires a separate analysis. Each of the distinct and
117. See id.; infra notes 123-37 and accompanying text.
118. See 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 9. Twenty-six billion dollars were spent
for drugs and medical supplies in 1984, a growth of 9.4% over such spending in 1983. See id.
at 14.
119. The rate of growth of spending for what are categorized in national statistics as
"other personal health goods and services" represented $51 billion in 1984, an increase of
12.9%. See id. This is a remarkably high rate compared to the moderated rate of growth in
total NHEs and in other major categories of health services for that year. See supra Tables 1
and 2. Projections for the rest of the decade indicate that this category of spending will
continue to increase at a slightly accelerated rate when compared to other health spending.
See HEALTH SPENDING TRENDS, supra note 33, at 22.
120. See 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 14; 1983 EXPENDITURES, supra note 24,
at 10. Note that all of the increase in spending for prescription drugs and medical sundries
since 1978 can be attributed to price inflation.
121. Price inflation, coupled with a strong increase in demand for dental services-
prompted apparently by increased insurance coverage-resulted in an increase in dental ex-
penditures of 15% in 1984. See 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 14.
122. See P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 17, at 124-25.
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varying influences must be isolated, including changes in utilization
(prompted by changes in third-party coverage and other factors),
changes in "intensity," price inflation, and, perhaps, other influ-
ences. While this may qualify and complicate any attempt to sum-
marize health spending trends, such further analyses are
nonetheless important in evaluating either the need for cost contain-
ment or the impact of possible reform measures. Obviously, any
major change in the factors driving expenditures for these items can
produce some increase in overall spending or disguise decreases in
other items, although any such effects would be on a somewhat
lesser scale than those that could be produced by a change in the
factors driving expenditures for physician or hospital services. Con-
versely, factors that produce decreases in spending for drugs, dental
services, or other such items may also contribute to the same "ap-
parent success" phenomenon discussed earlier, and, again, compli-
cate the assessment of cost-containment measures. Finally, any
cost-containment measure targeted to increases in one category of
spending may have an unexpected or undesired impact on other ar-
eas of spending.
The potential significance of these other services to cost contain-
ment, and the necessity of examining them separately, can best be
illustrated by reference to the rising expenditures for nursing home
services. Total expenditures related to nursing homes were less
than $500 million in 1960, less than 2% of NHEs.1 23 That share
rose quickly to 5% of NHEs in 1965 and increased to 8% in
1983,124 following the enactment of Kerr-Mills, Medicaid and
Medicare, and other government programs that provided, virtually
for the first time, insurance-type coverage for nursing home serv-
ices. 125 As a result, spending for nursing home services has been
regarded as the fastest growing portion of the national health
budget, 126 as well as a growing share of state and federal budgets. 127
In the most recent years, however, spending increases relating to
nursing homes, as with other health spending, have apparently
123. See 1983 EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 7. See generally supra Table 2. For
projections through 1990, see HEALTH SPENDING TRENDS, supra note 33, at 20.
124. See 1983 EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 7.
125. For a history (through the late 1970's) of nursing homes and government policy, as
well as an analysis of the role of third-party reimbursement in spawning the growth of the
nursing home industry, see B. VLADECK, UNLOVING CARE 30-70 (1980).
126. See supra Table 2; Figure 4. Between 1973 and 1983, nursing home spending in-
creased at an average annual rate of 16%. See HEALTH SPENDING TRENDS, supra note 33, at
22.
127. See infra notes 149-53, 167-68, and accompanying text.
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moderated; total expenditures for nursing homes grew to $32 billion
in 1984, an increase of only 8.9% from 1983. The proportionate
share of total health spending has stabilized at roughly 8% of
NHEs.1
28
While nursing home spending is relatively small and apparently
has slowed from its earlier rates of rapid growth, an examination of
the factors responsible for the historic increases suggests, nonethe-
less, that nursing home spending may become increasingly problem-
atic. In fact, some experts have predicted future nursing home
spending-or at least spending for long-term care generically ' 9 -to
be a potential public policy "time bomb."13 As indicated by Figure
6, estimates for the last decade show that increases in the "inten-
sity" of service or in inflation have had a slightly lesser effect on
increases in nursing home spending-indeed, service-specific price
inflation has been remarkably low-than they have had on spending
for other services.131
128. See 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 13.
129. Nursing homes, of course, are only one type of long-term care. Indeed, the defini-
tion of "long-term care" and the appropriateness of providing it through nursing homes is a
source of some controversy. See generally Doty, Liu & Wiener, An Overview of Long-Term
Care, 6 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Spr. 1985, at 69.
130. See S. CRYSTAL, supra note 69, at 23-26. Extrapolating from the demographic
trends of this decade (and assuming no major change in patterns of utilization), the federal
government estimated that there will be a 132% increase in the nursing home population by
the year 2030. See id. at 26.
131. Compare these data with Figure 2 and Figure 5. Note, however, that these estimates
exclude spending for intermediate-level nursing home services to the mentally retarded (ICF-
MR). ICF-MR spending truly skyrocketed during the 1970's and remains one of the most
volatile items in the health budget. See 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 13. Indeed,
while ICF-MR spending growth has slowed to levels comparable to other nursing home serv-
ices in the last several years, ICF-MR spending still deserves special attention, especially for
Medicaid policymakers. See infra note 168; Wing, supra note 19, at 1, 9; Wing, North Caro-
lina's Medicaid Program: The Effects of the Reagan-Era Budget Reductions, 14 N.C. CENT.
L.J. 313, 324-26 (1984).
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FIGURE 6
FACTORS ACCOUNTING FOR GROWTH IN
EXPENDITURES FOR NURSING HOME CARE
(excluding intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded)
Population
7.2% 8.7% rice Increases in Excess -
of Inflation
Inflation-(13.6% - Anissons Per Capita-
54.7%
15.81
- I ntensity Per Adission
All Factors 1973-1983 Service
22.8%
Related Factors Only
SOURCE- Levit, Lazenby, Waldo & Davidoff, National Health Expenditures. 1984, HEALTH CARE FIN.
Ri'v., Fall 1985, at 13 and Arnett, Cowell, Davidoff& Freeland, Health Spending Trends in
the 1980.v Adjusting to Financial Incentives, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Spr. 1985, at 10.
Increases in utilization, however, played a much larger role than
was the case with hospital and physician services. Although tracea-
ble to a number of factors,132 this increased utilization was due most
notably to the shift in American demographics towards the eld-
erly.133 Data for 1984 confirm these observations. The role of pop-
ulation increases continued to grow, while the influence of inflation
slightly decreased and differed markedly from the role of inflation in
spending for other services.134 Pairing the predicted "graying" of
the American population with the fairly well-documented, unmet
132. For a discussion of the various factors, see 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at
13; HEALTH SPENDING TRENDS, supra note 33, at 22-23.
133. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
134. See supra Figure 6; cf supra Figures 2 and 5.
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demand for long-term care even in the existing population,"3 5 many
experts believe that nursing home spending could well skyrocket in
the next decade, even if inflation moderates or spending for other
health care services is contained."a Indeed, government policy at
both the state and federal levels has already resulted in much more
rigorous strategy towards regulating the nursing home industry and
containing nursing home costs than it has for any other sector of the
health care industry, a posture that will likely continue.' 37
D. Some Observations
As all of the discussion in this section should demonstrate, dis-
aggregating the rising costs of health care and assessing their impli-
cations for the economy is a complicated and technically difficult
task. The available data are too summary and too quickly outdated
to provide more than tentative answers even to the most basic ques-
tions. The answers to the most critical questions-most particu-
larly, isolating the causal roles of price inflation, changes in service
utilization, or changes in "intensity"- can only be addressed in the
most qualified and sketchy terms. A review of the literature indi-
cates that critical attempts to submit these questions to sophisti-
cated economic analysis are as much normative models of what
might have happened in the past as they are descriptive analyses of
either our past or present circumstances.138 Indeed, it is fairly clear
from the literature-and exceedingly clear in the halls of practical
politics-that our ability to understand the economics of health
care delivery and to apply that understanding to contemporary poli-
cymaking is rather limited.
But while a sophisticated understanding of health care costs
may be beyond us, the available data do confirm some basic obser-
vations that can and should be applied by health policy deci-
sionmakers in defining the need for cost containment and in
charting a course for its resolution. First of all, the "fundamental
problem" of health care costs to the economy is not primarily one
of Americans demanding ever more medical care; nor is it one of
more Americans demanding ever more. Organ transplants or the
other offerings of today's technology for tomorrow's medicine may
135. See, e.g., Weissert, Estimating the Long-Term Care Population: Prevalence Rates
and Selected Characteristics, 6 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Summer 1985, at 83.
136. HEALTH SPENDING TRENDS, supra note 33, at 22-23.
137. See Harrington & Swan, Medicaid Nursing Home Reimbursement Policies, Rates,
and Expenditures, 6 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Fall 1984, at 39.
138. See P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 17, at 234-44.
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someday create a fundamental cost problem for which, among other
things, rationing of one sort or another will be required. Rapid in-
creases in the demand for nursing homes and other services by the
elderly, spurred by the predicted shifts in demographics, may also
require limits on utilization in the not-too-distant future. The in-
creasing "intensity" of the services delivered will also continue to
contribute significantly to future health care costs, as it has in the
past, and may become increasingly problematic.
But at least when viewed in the aggregate, these are not the
"fundamental" cost problems of the 1980's for the American econ-
omy. The cost problems of this decade are woven into the econom-
ics of inflation, meaning inflation in prices throughout the economy,
as well as inflation over and above general inflation in the prices
paid for the goods and services that we regard as health care.
NHEs have been increasing for a variety of reasons but primarily
because of the rising costs of producing and delivering those serv-
ices. That inflation continues today, even if it is disguised by the
apparent moderation of "health care inflation" in the popular, but
technically incorrect, sense of the term.
To blame price inflation for increases in health care costs is, of
course, only a symptomatic analysis, not the isolation or the evalua-
tion of underlying causes. And, as with the rise in aggregate na-
tional spending, price inflation can in some respects be explained,
perhaps even justified, by our social and economic circumstances
and the inherent nature of the services which are involved. The
slow growth of productivity in health care may not be able to keep
pace with the growth of public expectations, leading, economists
have argued, to inflation in prices. 139 Some amount of inflation in
the costs of a valuable service, as mentioned earlier, may be part of
the price we pay for a maturing economy. For that matter, esti-
mates of price inflation, technically an attempt to measure increases
in the cost of the "inputs" used to produce the same product or
service or changes in those "inputs," only roughly distinguish be-
tween changes in "inputs" and changes in the "intensity" of the
service. Surely the same service-a day in the hospital or a visit to
the physician-is not being provided today as it was yesterday, even
in the most basic sense. But the relative influence of price inflation
139. Economists theorize that industries with slower growing productivity may experi-
ence more rapid price inflation; the health care industry generally has slow or even negative
growth. When new technology can be applied, however, there is a tendency to oversaturate
the market in response to consumer expectations of getting the "best" available. See 1983
EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 5.
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on health care costs, both historically and, in particular, through
the last decade, is too significant and too consistent to be dismissed
as the product of either these somewhat mitigating circumstances or
the difficulty of separating real price inflation from changes in the
nature of the services delivered.
Indeed, experts from a variety of disciplines--economists, pub-
lic policy analysts, health services researchers, and virtually every-
one that has studied the "fundamental problem"-have uniformly
agreed that inflation in health care prices and the resulting impact
on health care costs and, as a result, on the economy, must be
traced to other, more retributional factors, deriving from the man-
ner in which health care is financed and organized. There is little
agreement on the relative influence of various systemic characteris-
tics. The literature abounds in debate over the causal relationship
between medical care price inflation and a number of factors: cost-
based or fee-for-service reimbursement;" comprehensive third-
party coverage;141 "freedom of choice;"' 142 government payment or
tax subsidy of health services; 143 or other structural or financial
characteristics of American health care delivery.'" But the central
theme of this criticism is fairly unanimous: the methods by which
health services in this country have been traditionally delivered and
financed have created the circumstances where both providers and
their patients are relatively insulated from the costs of the services
that are delivered. At least, the immediate and direct impact of
those costs has been greatly reduced. Under such circumstances,
providers may be inclined to provide more, for both the best and the
worst of motives; and patients may be inclined to request-and ac-
cept- more. To some extent, then, the historic increases in utiliza-
tion of services and the continuing increases in "intensity" of
140. See A. ENTHOVEN, supra note 12, at xvii-xxi; Meyer, Health Care Competition: Are
Tax Incentives Enough?, in A NEW APPROACH TO THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE 426
(M. Olsen ed. 1981).
141. See Havighurst, Decentralizing Decision Making: Private Contracts versus Profes-
sional Norms, in MARKET REFORMS IN HEALTH CARE: CURRENT ISSUES, NEW DIREC-
TIONS, STRATEGIC DECISIONS (J. Meyer ed. 1983); Havighurst & Hackbarth, Private Cost
Containment, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1298 (1979).
142. See Swoap, Beyond DRGs: Shifting the Risk to Providers, 3 HEALTH AFF., Winter
1984, at 117. For a lengthy discussion of the history of "freedom of choice" in American
medicine, as well as its economic implications, see Weller, "Free Choice" as a Restraint of
Trade in American Health Care Delivery and Insurance, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1351 (1984).
143. See generally McClure, supra note 12, at 2; Enthoven, supra note 12, at 21.
144. See 1983 EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 5; 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23,
at 2-6.
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services may also be attributed in part to these systemic
characteristics.
But more important, there is little incentive under such circum-
stances to offset the various pressures on physicians, hospitals, and
other health service providers to increase the costs of the various
goods and services they provide or, at least, to tolerate such in-
creases. 145 To address the "fundamental problem" of the 1980's
and to contain the rising costs of health care, these systemic charac-
teristics must somehow be modified or reformed. As a matter of
sound public policy, such systemic reform should be designed to
impact on the inflating prices of medical care services as much as, if
not more than, on other factors that influence health care costs.
Obviously, any significant improvement in the general econ-
omy-a slowing of general inflation, an increase in productivity, or
a change in any other "health indicator" of our economic status-
can reduce, or at least mask, the economic effects of inflating health
care costs. In fact, the health of our economy, rather than the eco-
nomics of health care itself, may be the best predictor of the day of
reckoning for health care cost containment. But just as it is difficult
to predict any significant or long-lasting improvements in the
American economy, it is equally difficult to foresee the advent of
any other mitigating factor to offset the problematic character of
health care costs to that economy. In particular, it is difficult to
suggest that the historic trend of price inflation, in the technically
correct sense of that term, is moderating.
The rising costs of health care may not be a crisis for the econ-
omy in the 1980's; they may not even constitute a problem of funda-
mental proportions. Nonetheless, strong arguments still can be
made that rising health care costs deserve serious attention. Health
care continues to demand more and more of our economic output.
Health care is purchased at the expense of other economic activities.
Every dollar spent on health care cannot be spent elsewhere. When
one out of ten dollars is spent on health care, the economic effect of
that spending can be said, with only slight exaggeration, to influ-
ence virtually everything: interest rates, social and domestic spend-
ing, even international competitiveness. 46 All of these economic
effects have been muted in recent years by the moderation of the
rise in total spending. But health care costs continue to rise and
continue to inflate. Given the underlying causes of these trends, it
145. See P. FELDSTEIN, supra note 17, at 178-81, 224-25.
146. See, e.g., Thurow, Letter to the Editor, 311 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1596 (1984).
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is clear that these costs should be of immediate concern, and it is
likely that they will become increasingly problematic, particularly if
one assumes that the availability and distribution of health care
should be maintained at current levels.
From the point of view of the practical politician, however,
health care cost inflation has both a different meaning and different
implications for the health policy agenda of the 1980's. First of all,
the apparent moderation of rising health care costs in recent years,
whether truly a resolution of the "fundamental problem" or not, is
critically important. Notwithstanding economic analysis, the cost
problem in the political arena is precisely what is perceived as the
problem, not what is indicated or suggested by empirical data. A
reduction in the rate of growth of health care costs is a reduction of
the problem, whatever the underlying causes. Any improvement in
the economy is a resolution to the problem, not just a postponement
of our reckoning with it. The healthier the economy, the greater its
ability both economically and politically to absorb the effects of ris-
ing health care costs.
Moreover, to the practical politician, the difficult task of bring-
ing the implications of rising health care costs for the economy to
the attention of various interest groups and, particularly, to the
fickle general public during a time of moderating growth of those
costs is only one-half of the political problem. Focusing attention
on increases in the "intensity" of medical services or on price infla-
tion as being the most problematic aspects of rising health care costs
necessarily suggests a range of remedial responses that will gore the
providers' oxen in their most sensitive areas. As noted above, there
is nearly endless debate among experts over the characteristics or
mechanisms of health care delivery most likely responsible for ris-
ing health care costs, and little basis in the available data for bring-
ing cloture to that debate. But there is a general consensus that the
containment of those costs will require substantial and systemic
modification of the manner in which health care is delivered and
financed. Yet, such reform will necessarily involve changing the
systemic characteristics that provider interests will defend most vig-
orously. Ultimately, any serious reform strategy designed to affect
any of the causal factors in health care spending and, most cer-
tainly, intended to contain the increases in the price of a unit of
service-whether coerced or mandated, the result of public
purchasing, or the result of competitive reforms within the private
sector-will directly affront the traditional autonomy of providers,
as well as their economic self-interest.
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As indicated previously, the ability of providers to defend their
interests has been somewhat diluted in recent years, but provider
resistance nevertheless remains a powerful political constraint on
any cost-containment strategy. Moreover, such resistance can be
almost insurmountable under conditions where the public's atten-
tion remains unfocused, as it currently is, and the concerns of other
affected interest groups have been deflated by the recent trends of
moderating costs. Thus, the economic effects of rising health care
costs continue to deserve our attention, and remedial strategies can
be strongly advised as sound public policy, even though the rate of
increase in health care costs is moderating. But it is fairly clear as a
matter of practical politics that health care cost containment should
not be considered a prominent issue, much less the focal issue, on
the health policy agenda of the 1980's. For a variety of reasons-
the fickle attention of the American public, the dominant political
power of provider interests, the varying definitions of the "funda-
mental problem," or simply the fact that the proportions of the
problem are within politically acceptable limits--our political insti-
tutions do not appear to be focusing on the economic costs of health
care or moving towards cost containment, at least in the broadest
sense of the term. Rather, as will be discussed in the next section,
government policymakers, and particularly federal policymakers,
are establishing a health policy agenda for the 1980's that defines
the "fundamental problem," the need for its resolution, and the
likely responses to it in much different terms.
III. THE "FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM:" THE RISING COSTS OF
HEALTH CARE FOR THE GOVERNMENT
Even if they have not risen to the level of a "fundamental prob-
lem," the rising costs of health care for the economy should be of
some concern to state and federal policymakers. Indeed, as health
care costs have grown to demand a greater proportion of the GNP,
health care costs may be both a product of prevailing economic con-
ditions and, at the same time, one important determinant of those
conditions. But in terms of the real politics of the 1980's, the costs
of health care of primary concern to our legislators have not been
those to the economy, but rather the direct costs to the state and
federal budgets: the rising costs of Medicare and Medicaid, of
health insurance benefits for government employees, and of other
health-related government programs.
Such concern is understandable, even viewed solely as a matter
of public policy and divorced from its political context. Over the
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last two decades, government spending for health care has rapidly
increased. State, local, and federal governments combined spent
only $11 billion for health care in 1965, 26% of all NHEs. 47 Only
two years later, following the implementation of Medicaid and
Medicare, total government spending jumped to $19 billion and
grew to represent nearly 37% of all health spending.1 48 Between
1968 and 1980, government spending continued to grow rapidly,
increasing at an average annual rate of over 14%. It reached $56
billion by 1975 and nearly $106 billion by 1980, 42% of all NHEs
and over 50% of all hospital care. 49 All tolled, this growth ex-
ceeded the rate of growth of NHEs by a significant margin and ex-
ceeded the GNP growth rate during this period by nearly 50%,
although most of the disproportionate growth of government spend-
ing occurred between 1965 and 1975, as indicated by Table 6.15°
147. See 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 3.
148. See id.
149. See 1983 EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 3-4, 16.
150. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. Note, however, that these figures reflect
total government spending. The growth rates for federal health spending and for Medicare
spending during this period differ significantly. See infra Table 7. Similarly, government
health spending as a proportion of all government spending has also followed a different
trend. See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 6
GOVERNMENT SPENDING (in billions): PERCENTAGE of NHE
FEDERAL % OF STATE AND LOCAL % OF
YEAR EXPENDITURES NHE EXPENDITURES NHE
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969
1968
1967
1966
1965
1960
1955
1950
$127.6
111.9
102.7
93.2
83.5
71.0
61.0
53.8
47.4
42.6
37.0
31.0
25.2
22.9
20.3
(30.4)%
28.9
28.9
29.0
29.3
28.7
28.4
28.4
27.9
28.2
27.9
26.6
24.4
24.4
24.3
23.6
24.5
24.3
23.2
16.1
13.2
11.2
11.3
12.8
$51.9
48.3
45.4
41.9
38.1
34.3
29.8
26.1
22.7
20.3
19.3
16.6
14.2
12.5
11.4
10.1
8.9
8.0
7.0
6.1
5.5
3.6
2.6
(12.4)%
12.5
12.8
13.0
13.3
13.9
13.9
13.7
13.3
13.5
14.5
14.3
13.7
13.3
13.6
13.5
13.5
13.7
13.7
13.2
13.0
13.5
14.4
SOURCE: Gibson, Levit, Lazenby & Waldo, National Health Expenditures, 1983, HEALTH
CARE FIN. REv., Winter 1984, Table 1, at 3, and Levit, Lazenby, Waldo &
Davidoff, National Health Expenditures, 1984, HEALTH CARE FIN. REv., Fall
1985, Table 1, at 3.
In fact, the government's proportionate share of all health
spending essentially stabilized between 1975 and 1983, and in the
most recent years the rate of growth of both state and federal gov-
ernment spending has been slightly slower than that of NHEs, as
Table 7 indicates. In 1983, total government spending for health
care was $148.8 billion, an increase of 9.6% from 1982.151 In 1984,
government spent $160 billion on health care, an increase of 8.2%
from 1983, representing 41% of all NHEs.152 In both years, the
151. See 1983 EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 3.
152. See 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 3, 31-32. See generally HEALTH SPEND-
ING TRENDS, supra note 33, at 9-10 (discussing probable future public spending trends).
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NHE growth rate was slightly higher.153
TABLE 7
GOVERNMENT HEALTH BUDGET GROWTH:
Expenditures
% Change in
YEAR STATE and LOCAL FEDERAL TOTAL NHE
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969
1968
1967
1966
1965
1960
1955
1950
6.5%
8.4
10.4
9.7
9.0%
10.2
14.6
17.5
9.1%
10.6
13.9
15.2
SOURCE: Gibson, Levit, Lazenby, & Waldo, National Health Expenditures, 1983,
HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Winter 1984, Table 1, at 3, and Levit, Lazenby,
Waldo, & Davidoff, National Health Expenditures, 1984, HEALTH CARE FIN.
REV., Fall 1985, Table 1, at 3.
Obviously, much of the growth in government spending during
the last two decades has been a result of Medicaid and Medicare.
In fact, virtually all of the increase in government's share of total
health spending since 1965 has been a result of the increase in fed-
eral spending prompted by these programs.1 54 The state and local
share of personal health services has actually declined from 13% in
1967 to 10% in 1983, despite the portion of Medicaid costs paid by
153. See supra Table 1.
154. See supra Table 6.
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each state. 55 It may be equally critical to note that the percentage
of all government spending that has been required for health care
rose markedly from 1965 to 1983, reaching a peak of 13.2% of all
state and local budgets and 12.5% of the federal budget in 1983, as
Figure 7 indicates. 5 6 In 1984, however, the share of local and state
spending required for health care dropped to 12.8%, while the
share of the federal budget required for health spending rose
slightly to 12.7%."'x
As Medicare and Medicaid have grown to finance care for one
out of five Americans, and three quarters of all public spending for
health care, they have become the primary vehicles for government
influence over health policy. 15 8 But at the same time, the growing
costs of these programs-most specifically, the growing costs for
the federal budget-not their impact or adequacy, have become the
more dominant focus of political concern.
A review of the available data summarizing the historic costs
associated with these programs clearly indicates that these costs de-
serve political attention. But it also indicates that the emergence of
government spending as the focal issue on the health policy agenda
derives not from the costs of these programs per se, but from the
155. See 1983 EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 17-19. Note that this estimate is for
personal health services, not NHEs. The state and local share of total NHEs has remained
fairly constant, but it has clearly not increased. See infra Table 8. These figures deserve some
emphasis, since they are frequently obscured in public debates. Almost all of the increase in
the proportionate share of government spending for health care in the last 20 years has been
due to a sizable increase in the federal share of health spending. And most of that increase
has been a result of Medicaid and, in particular, Medicare spending. Expressing the state and
local share in terms of personal health spending has particular relevance: the state and local
share has declined, notwithstanding Medicaid spending for nursing homes and other personal
health services financed in part by state and local government. Obviously these figures are all
relative; the state and local spending has been increasing-and in the eyes of state and local
legislators, it has been "inflating"-- but health spending generally, and federal health spend-
ing in particular, has been growing at a much faster rate. See infra Figure 7.
156. See also HEALTH SPENDING TRENDS, supra note 33, at 11.
157. Preliminary data for 1985 indicate that state and local spending will drop again to
12.6%, while federal spending will increase to 12.9% of the federal budget. Telephone inter-
view with Sally Sonnefeld, Division of National Cost Estimates, Office of the Actuary, Health
Care Financing Administration (March 26, 1986).
158. See 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 23; Gornick, Greenberg, Eggers & Dob-
son, Twenty Years of Medicare and Medicaid: Covered Populations, Use of Benefits and Pro-
gram Expenditures, 6 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Supp. 1985, at 13, 20 [hereinafter cited as
Gornick & Greenberg].
Government influence has been heaviest in institutionally based medical care. Medicare
and Medicaid combined spent $48.6 billion, 38% of all hospital care in 1984. See 1984 EX-
PENDITURES, supra note 23, at 9, 22. All tolled, including state and local funding, govern-
ment financed 53% of all hospital services and 49% of all nursing home services in 1984. See
id. at 17.
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FIGURE 7
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES FOR HEALTH AS A
PERCENT OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES,
Selected Years 1950-1984
- STATE
[] - FEDERAL
11 950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1983 1984
YEAR
SOURCE: Arnett, Cowell, Davidoff & Freeland, Health Spending Trends in the 19807" Adjusting to
Financial Incentives. HiEAlrtH CARE FIN. REV.. Spring 1985, at 18.
larger political and economic determinants that have isolated and
magnified the immediate importance of these costs.
A. Medicaid
There is no doubt that Medicaid, since its inception, has been an
expensive undertaking for both the states and the federal govern-
ment, as Table 8 indicates.
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TABLE 8
MEDICAID EXPENDITURES (in billions) AND ANNUAL
PERCENT CHANGE
STATE AND LOCAL % FEDERAL %
YEAR EXPENDITURES CHANGE EXPENDITURES CHANGE
1987
1986
1985 $18.6 11.0% $22.7 9.6%
1984 16.7 8.2 20.7 6.8
1983 15.5 9.1 19.4 10.0
1982 14.2 6.7 17.6 6.6
1981 13.3 18.3 16.5 18.1
1980 11.2 15.8 14.0 15.5
1979 9.7 13.4 12.1 1.4
1978 8.6 12.0 10.6 10.5
1977 7.6 - 9.6 -
1976 8.3 - 10.3 -
1975 5.6 23.7 7.0 24.7
1974 4.6 11.2 5.6 12.6
1973 4.1 18.2 5.0 19.5
1972 3.5 24.1 4.2 23.5
1971 2.8 28.6 3.4 32.2
1970 2.2 - 2.6 -
SOURCE: Telephone interview with Myles McDermott, Budget Branch, Division of State
Operations and Financial Management, Health Care Financing Administration,
U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services (April 4, 1986) (% change for 1976,
1977 omitted because of redefinition of fiscal year in 1976).
Particularly in the first few years of implementation, as more
states established their programs and as coverage and eligibility
were expanding, Medicaid's costs truly skyrocketed.' 59 As the pro-
grams were stabilized in the 1970's and, more important, as Con-
gress and the states turned to various cost-cutting measures in
attempts to contain these costs, 160 the growth rate of Medicaid ex-
penditures roughly paralleled that for NHEs.' 61 Between 1972 and
1982, the average annual increase for the states' share of Medicaid
spending was 16.9%; the annual growth of the federal share was
slightly lower, although obviously there was a great deal of variabil-
ity from state to state.
162
159. See Wing, supra note 19, at 15-16.
160. See id. at 16-28.
161. See supra Table 8 for state and federal expenditures and annual percentage increases.
Note that these are recent estimates and differ slightly from estimates cited in other sources.
See infra notes 162-65 and accompanying text. For increases in NHEs, see supra Table 1.
162. See Gornick & Greenberg, supra note 158, at 50. From 1973 to 1983, the average
1986]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE L4W REVIEW
In contrast, however, the growth of Medicaid spending in the
1980's has slowed considerably, even when compared to the moder-
ating growth of NHEs. In 1982, total Medicaid spending grew only
6.7%, following the first round of Reagan-era budget reductions,
when NIIEs grew 12.6%.163 In 1983, the Medicaid growth rate
was 9.7%, again considerably lower than the growth of NHEs.1 4
In 1984, total Medicaid costs had grown to over $37 billion, but the
aggregate growth rate was still only 7.1% over the previous year,
and again lower than that for NIHEs. 16
5
There is little reason to believe that these recent trends of slow-
ing growth will be reversed. Indeed, it would appear that, in rela-
tive terms, Medicaid costs have already been contained-at least
when viewed in the aggregate. Again, Medicaid spending differs
significantly from state to state. The political decision to constrain
the growth of the Medicaid population has apparently already been
made and has been successful. 66 Nor is it likely that the use of
Medicaid service coverage will grow; to the contrary, the pattern
for at least a decade has been to reduce coverage and limit utiliza-
tion growth. 167  Presumably, Medicaid is still subject to various
other factors, such as price inflation and intensity increases, that
can increase Medicaid spending, as they influence other health care
expenditures. But there is no factor specific to the growth of Medi-
caid costs, or anything unique to the services financed through
Medicaid-with the notable exception of ICF-MR services 16S-that
should necessarily draw political attention to the costs of Medicaid
annual increase in the federal share was just over 13%. See HEALTH SPENDING TRENDS,
supra note 33, at 11.
163. Using the estimates in Table 8, state and federal spending increased only $2 billion
in 1982. For a discussion of the Reagan budget cuts, see Wing, supra note 19, at 42-59.
164. In 1983, total Medicaid spending increased to $34.9 billion. See supra Table 8; 1983
EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 23.
165. See supra Table 8; 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 24. Projections into the
future have predicted a Medicaid growth rate into the next decade of 9% per year. HEALTH
SPENDING TRENDS, supra note 33, at 11.
166. While Medicaid data on the number of people eligible for the program are difficult
to analyze, it is clear that the number of recipients (and probably the number of eligibles) has
not increased in at least a decade, and may even have declined. See Gornick & Greenberg,
supra note 158, at 27-28. This should be compared to the increase in the number of poor
people during the same period of time. See id. at 34.
167. For an analysis of the use of services by the Medicaid population and the complexi-
ties of the available data, see id. at 41-42; Wing, supra note 19, at 17-28, 49-59, 66-69.
168. As noted earlier, long-term care generally and, in particular, ICF-MR services
funded by Medicaid, present problems deserving separate and special attention and that have
already required considerable government cost containment. See supra note 131.
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or require that Medicaid spending be viewed as a problem of grow-
ing importance.
What is not clear, and what could well be the more critical mea-
sure of the problematic character of Medicaid expenditures, even as
they have been contained, is whether Medicaid spending is continu-
ing to outgrow other state expenditures and, in particular, the
growth of state revenues. As discussed more fully below, the most
crucial question for Congress as it defines the need for and the de-
sign of Medicaid cost containment may be the size of the gap be-
tween federal expenditures and federal revenues, a gap that has
widened even as Medicaid expenditures have slowed.169 Similarly,
Medicaid was, until the 1980's, the fastest growing portion of the
states' budgets, 70 growing, at least in the aggregate, faster than the
growth of state revenues. 7 ' If this trend has continued, or contin-
ues in some states, there will certainly be substantial political pres-
sure for cost containment at the state level, regardless of recent
trends of slowed growth in Medicaid expenditures. Unfortunately,
recent data for revenue growth of individual states is not
available. 172
B. Medicare
Since the first full year of its implementation, total Medicare
expenditures have risen from $3.4 billion to nearly $62 billion in
1984 and have grown to represent nearly 50% of all government
expenditures for personal health care.1 73 As reflected in Table 9,
the rate of this increase has been dramatic, nearly doubling the ag-
gregate growth of NHEs during the last two decades and growing
20% in some years."
169. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
170. State Medicaid expenditures increased from 2% of total state spending to 7.7% be-
tween 1965 and 1981, and from 23.8% of state welfare budgets to 60% of all welfare budgets
during this period (although this is partially explained by the slow increase in spending for
the cash grant programs). See Gornick & Greenberg, supra note 158, at 48.
171. State revenues grew at an average annual rate of only 11.4% between 1972 and
1982, while Medicaid spending grew at an annual average rate of 16.9%. See id. at 50. Note,
however, that these are aggregate figures. There was great variation from state to state.
172. For aggregated data on state expenditure and revenue trends, see NAT'L GOVER-
NOR'S ASS'N AND NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, FISCAL SURVEY OF THE
STATES (1985).
173. See infra Table 9; 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 23-24.
174. See also supra Table 1; HIAA, supra note 60, at 28.
19861
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
TABLE 9
MEDICARE: Enrollment, Disbursement, % Growth.
NUMBER OF TOTAL
FISCAL ENROLLED DISBURSEMENTS
YEAR PERSONS (A and B) % GROWTH
1986 $76,070 6.9%
1985 71,183 13.9
1984 - 62,480 9.7
1983 30.0 56,935 12.9
1982 29.5 50.424 18.7
1981 29.0 42,488 21.3
1980 28.5 35,025 20.1
1979 27.9 29,157 15.6
1978 27.2 25,218 17.0
1977 26.5 21,549 21.2
1976 25.7 17,779 20.3
1975 25.0 14,782 30.3
1974 24.2 11,348 19.7
1973 23.5 9,479 7.5
1972 21.3 8,820 12.0
1971 20.9 7,875 10.2
1970 20.5 7,149 8.4
1969 20.1 6,598 23.4
1968 19.8 5,347 57.4
1967 19.5 3,396 -
SOURCE: Enrollment from HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, SOURCE
BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA 1984-85 (1985), Table 4.3, at 34.
Disbursement from Board of Trustees, Federal Hospital Insurance Trust
Fund, 1985 Annual Report, H.R. Doc. No. 99-47, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., at 30
and Board of Trustees, Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust
Fund, 1985 Annual Report, H.R. Doc. No. 99-48, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., at
21. 1985 and 1986 are estimated disbursements.
As with spending for NHEs and for most health services, the
rate of growth of Medicare appears to be moderating in the most
recent years; yet that rate has continued to exceed that for NHEs.
In 1983, Medicare grew 12.9%, as compared to 10.6% growth in
NHEs.'75 In 1984, when NHE growth slowed to 9.1% and the in-
crease in government spending for health care fell to 9.0%, Medi-
care spending growth was 9.7%.176 As noted above, the rate of
growth of total federal health spending has essentially stabilized in
this decade, but only because expenditures for Medicaid and other
175. See supra Table 9. See supra Table I for growth of NHEs and growth of GNP
during this same period.
176. See supra Table 9; 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 24. See also infra note
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federal health programs have been contained or, in some cases,
markedly reduced. 77 Medicare spending has continued to grow in
both relative and absolute terms; thus, Medicare has continued to
demand a large and growing proportion of the federal budget.
17 8
A review of the factors responsible for the growth of Medicare
spending indicates why these rising costs may be both particularly
problematic and expected to continue. Obviously, a good portion of
the increases over the last two decades is attributable to the inflation
in the prices of medical services and the increases in the "intensity"
of services, as described previously.'79 But Medicare costs have
been compounded by several additional factors. The eligibility for
the program has been expanded several times in the last two de-
cades.180 More important, the population over age 65, as noted pre-
177. See HEALTH SPENDING TRENDS, supra note 33, at 11. For a discussion of the pro-
grams that have been contained or "streamlined," see HOUSE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 99TH
CONG., 2D SESS., PRESIDENT REAGAN'S FISCAL YEAR 1987 BUDGET 1-17 (Comm. Print
1986) [hereinafter cited as 1987 BUDGET].
178. See infra Figure 8. Medicare represented approximately 6.8% of the federal budget
in FY 1983 and grew to nearly 7% in 1984. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 99TH
CONG., 1ST SESS., PRESIDENT REAGAN'S FISCAL YEAR 1986 BUDGET (Comm. Print 1985);
1987 BUDGET, supra note 177, at 16, 217. (Note that these figures are based on congressional
estimates of budget outlays, not actual expenditures, and differ slightly from the figures cited
in Table 9.)
179. Roughly 70% of Medicare spending is for hospital services; another 20-25% is spent
for physician services. See 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 23. Hence, Medicare
spending would be expected to at least parallel growth rates in spending for these services in
the general population. But the growth of Medicare spending for these services has generally
exceeded that for the rest of the population. From 1977 to 1983, Medicare hospital expendi-
tures grew at an average annual rate of 16%, compared to a 13.9% increase in overall hospi-
tal expenditures. In 1984, the Medicare rate slowed to 9.6%, compared to 6.1% overall
hospital spending. See 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 24.
Medicare spending for physician services has also been growing at a higher rate than
overall spending for physician services. In 1983, it was $13.4 billion, an increase of 17.6%,
despite the relative decline in the growth rate for spending on physician services in the gen-
eral population. In 1984, the first year of the Medicare physician rate freeze, however, Medi-
care spent $14.6 billion, an increase of only 8.9%. See id. at 20-22.
180. There have been several major (and various minor) expansions of Medicare eligibil-
ity since the inception of the program in 1965. In 1972, Medicare eligibility was significantly
expanded by including disabled Social Security recipients and people with end stage renal
disease (ESRD). See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, §§ 201, 2991,
86 Stat. 1329, 1370, 1463. In 1983, federal employees and employees of non-profit organiza-
tions were required to participate in the Social Security payroll tax and, therefore, became
potentially eligible to receive Medicare benefits. See Social Security Amendments of 1983,
Pub. L. No. 98-21, §§ 101, 102, 97 Stat. 65, 67, 70. For a discussion of eligibility, see
Gornick & Greenberg, supra note 158, at 20-25.
With regard to the services covered, the essential package of services included in the
original legislation has remained virtually intact, with occasional minor additions (e.g., hos-
pice care was added in 1983) and, less frequently, the withdrawal of coverage. See 1984
EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 24; Gornick & Greenberg, supra note 158, at 35-41.
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viously, has been growing at a rate at least double that of the
general population, a growth rate that will continue and may well
explode as the "baby boom" generation ages." s" Medicare growth
rates also have been fueled by increases in the rates of utilization of
services by the Medicare population, again somewhat in contrast to
indications for the rest of the population, although the most recent
data shows a reversal of this trend. 8 2 But even if the higher rates of
service utilization by Medicare recipients have leveled off, the dis-
proportionate growth of the Medicare population over age 65 will
continue in future years, contradicting any likelihood that the
growth of Medicare spending will continue to moderate. To the
contrary, unless there are drastic reductions in Medicare utilization,
Medicare expenditures will continue to grow at rates as high as, and
more likely higher than, those for NHEs.
The growing political importance of the Medicare, Medicaid,
and other government health spending programs is only partially
explained by reference to the sizable and growing level of expendi-
tures required to maintain these programs--even in light of the pos-
sible rapid expansion of Medicare expenditures in the not-too-
distant future. At both the state and federal levels, it is clear that
the major forces that have essentially translated these cost problems
of serious proportions into problems of critical proportions-costs
for which a political response is virtually inevitable-come from the
opposite side of the budgetary ledger.
Contemporary federal politics provide the best illustration.
Prompted by economic stagnation, Reagan-generated tax reduc-
181. People over age 65 constituted only 9.4% of the general population in 1966; but by
1984, this had grown to 11.6% of the population. See Gornick & Greenberg, supra note 158,
at 20-22. See generally Waldo & Lazenby, supra note 18.
182. The data supporting Medicare utilization increases is somewhat mixed and difficult
to interpret. Since the beginning of the program, there has been a steady increase in the
utilization of hospitals by Medicare recipients (as measured by the discharge rate), even when
other factors, such as eligibility increases, are controlled. See Gornick & Greenberg, supra
note 158, at 35. This is somewhat at odds with the data reflecting hospital utilization by the
general population during the same period. See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
However, preliminary data for 1984 indicate that for the first time in a decade, the admission
rate for Medicare recipients dropped by roughly 4%. See Beebe, Lawrence & Lintzeris,
Medicare Admissions and Length of Stay for Short Stay Hospitals, 7 HEALTH CARE FIN.
REV., Supp. 1985, at 117. And, during the last 10 years, the average length of stay for the
elderly has been declining, paralleling the trend in the general population. See Gornick &
Greenberg, supra note 158, at 35; 1983 EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 22.
During this same period of time, there is also evidence that the Medicare utilization rates
for physician services has been increasing, although this may be caused in part by the use of
physician services incident to hospitalization. See Gornick & Greenberg, supra note 158, at
37-39.
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tions, and the continually widening gap between federal expendi-
tures and federal revenues, the federal budget has driven the
national debt over $2 trillion and has created annual losses of over
$200 billion, as demonstrated in Figure 8.183
FIGURE 8
FEDERAL BUDGET (in billions) FY 1985
DI - Net Interest
Defense
- Social Security
[ - Other Domestic Spending
14%) A. Income Security Programs
-Retirement and Disability
(non-Social Security)
-Welfare
(21% -Food Stamps
-Low Income Housing
B. Education
-Training, Employment
(all programs)
C. Health
-Medicare ($65.8)
-Medicaid ($22.7)
-Other ($10.9)
0. Other
REVENUES $734 billion
OUTLAYS -946 billion
($212 billion)
SOURCE. House Comm. on the Budget, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., President Reagan's Fiscal Year 1987
Budget (Comm. Print 1986) at 1, 141, 193, 206, 211, 217, 229, 249, 265-66.
The political implications of these debts can be easily sketched:
service on the debt now requires nearly 14% of federal spending,184
while military spending has grown to 28% of the budget during this
decade.1" 5 Social Security alone requires 21%, and other income
transfer programs (federally financed retirement and welfare pro-
grams) annually demand between 13 and 14% of federal spend-
ing.'8 6 The remaining 25% of the budget must support the long list
183. See also 1987 BUDGET, supra note 177, at 9, 35.
184. See id. at 249-51.
185. See id. at 73, 141. This represents an increase of 24% from the pre-1980 levels of
expenditures, although it is somewhat less of an increase than the present administration
originally intended. See Wing, supra note 19, at 32-33.
186. See 1987 BUDGET, supra note 177, at 218-31.
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of other federal domestic programs, of which Medicare is far and
away the largest and among the most rapidly increasing. And
Medicaid, even as its costs grow more slowly, is still among the
largest items.1 87 Even if total federal revenues are increased by eco-
nomic growth or by tax rate changes, or total spending is affected
by military spending cuts or Social Security reform (unlikely pos-
sibilities at best), annual budgetary gaps of $200 billion cannot be
easily closed without targeting the more politically vulnerable do-
mestic spending programs.
The emergence of Medicare costs as a problem of fundamental
importance and as the focal issue on the health policy agenda in the
1980's has also been prompted by its peculiar revenue structure.
Revenues for Part A of Medicare, covering essentially hospital and
related services, are funded exclusively by a portion of the Social
Security payroll tax,188 and are maintained and disbursed through
the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund. 89 This financing
structure was more than adequate through the first fifteen years of
the program. 90 The accumulated surplus was maintained at well
over 50% of annual Part A expenditures from the inception of the
program through 1980.191 But as program expenditures have con-
tinued to rise rapidly in the 1980's, revenues have grown more
187. See supra Figure 8; 1987 BUDGET, supra note 177, at 265.
188. In 1985, employers and employees euch contributed 1.35% of payroll to a maximum
of $39,600. Increases in both the percentage paid and the maximum ceiling on payroll sub-
ject to the tax are scheduled for periodic increases through 1990. See 26 U.S.C. § 3101
(1982). There is no contribution to the trust fund from general revenue or any other tax
basis. But see infra note 189. Any shortfall in Part A payments is paid out of accumulated
surplus in the trust fund, a financial backstop that has been invoked on only two occasions
thus far. See infra note 190.
189. For a technical description of the trust fund and its management, see BOARD OF
TRUSTEES, FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE TRUST FUND, 1985 ANNUAL REPORT, H.R.
Doc. No. 47, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-17 (1985) [hereinafter cited as 1985 TRUST FUND RE-
PORT].
To be technically correct, there is a small amount of general revenue funding of the hospi-
tal trust fund to cover various recipients of Medicare that are not covered through their
participation in Social Security. See id. at 8-13.
More important, Medicare services are also financed by the payments of recipients at the
time they receive the services through the various cost-sharing requirements imposed on Part
A recipients. In 1985, recipients paid the first $400 of Part A costs, $100 per day for the 61st
through 90th day; $200 per day for "lifetime reserve" days; and $50 per day for the 21st
through 100th day of SNF care. See 49 Fed. Reg. 38,514 (1985). These cost-sharing require-
ments are periodically revised. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395e (b)(2) (1982); 1985 TRUST FUND RE-
PORT, supra, at 66-67.
190. Prior to 1985, trust-fund shortfalls occurred only in 1972 and 1983, the latter as a
result of interfund borrowing by the Social Security trust fund. 1985 TRUST FUND REPORT,
supra note 189, at 30.
191. See id.
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slowly. Annual revenue shortfalls are now predicted to recur regu-
larly. The eventual depletion of the trust fund appears inevitable, 192
although the timing of this "trust fund crisis" is still a subject of
some debate, as illustrated by Figure 9.193
In any event, the widening gap between Medicare Part A ex-
penditures and Part A revenues from payroll taxes will eventually
require either new expenditure reductions or new revenue increases
of approximately $20 billion each year, at least by the middle of the
next decade.194
Concurrent with the emergence of the Part A "trust fund cri-
sis," Medicare Part B expenditures1 9 have been growing at a rate
192. See infra Figure 9. Only under the most optimistic (generally regarded as unrealis-
tic) economic and political assumptions could such a crisis be averted; on the other hand, the
trust fund could be depleted as early as the mid-1990's. Even under the most realistic as-
sumptions, sizable annual shortfalls are predicted by the early 1990's, and the depletion of the
fund is predicted by the end of the decade.
Moreover, from an actuarial perspective, the trust fund may already be viewed as a finan-
cial crisis. Historically, the Board of Trustees has managed the trust fund like an insurance
scheme and recommended that a 50% cushion-a surplus of 50% of the annual expendi-
tures-be maintained by the fund, presumably to offset any sudden shifts in program costs.
while this is standard practice for insurance schemes, there is no compelling reason to main-
tain such a surplus. The risk of such a sudden increase by a program of this size is very small,
and, speaking politically, the trust fund only parallels private insurance; in reality it is a
government program for which such actuarial conservatism may not be required.
It is also important to note that all of these assumptions already consider the influence of
prospective reimbursement and DRG-based reimbursement for hospitals. Thus, any modifi-
cation of the program to forestall or avert a crisis in the trust fund would necessarily be in
addition to these cost-containment measures. For a detailed discussion, see 1985 TRUST
FUND REPORT, supra note 189, at 33-48 56.
193. It should not go unnoticed that, during the 1990's, the Social Security Trust Fund
will build up an incredibly large surplus- over $480 billion by 1994-in anticipation of the
equally incredible payouts that will be required when the "baby boom" generation retires.
For a discussion, see Munnell, Social Security and the Budget, NEw ENG. ECON. REV., July-
Aug. 1985, at 5, 12. It is very conceivable that the Medicare Part A trust fund "crisis" will be
temporarily averted in the 1990's by borrowing from the Social Security fund.
It should also be noted that this "trust fund crisis" is not the similar "crisis" that will be
generated in the early part of the 21st century as the "baby boom generation" ages. See 1985
TRUST FUND REPORT, supra note 189, at 38-39.
194. See 1985 TRUST FUND REPORT, supra note 189, at 46; Ginsburg & Moon, An Intro-
duction to the Medicare Financing Problem, 62 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 167, 169-72
(1984).
Expressing this financial problem somewhat differently, in order for the trust fund to be
supported entirely by payroll deductions through the end of the century, the payroll tax rate
will have to be raised at least .52% (for both employer and employee) over and above the
scheduled increase to 2.9% of payroll by 1990. See 1985 TRUST FUND REPORT, supra note
189, at 47.
195. For a general discussion of Part B financing, see Hadley, How Should Medicare Pay
Physicians, 62 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 279 (1984); see also BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE TRUST FUND, 1985 ANNUAL REPORT
[hereinafter cited as 1985 MEDICAL INSURANCE REPORT].
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even greater than those of Part A, a trend also predicted to con-
tinue. 19 6 Ironically, since revenues derived from monthly premiums
are supplemented by general revenues, this presents no "trust fund
crisis" comparable to that for Part A funding.197  Nonetheless,
these rapidly increasing Part B expenditures will present a growing
political problem as the demand on general revenues must necessar-
ily grow at an even faster rate than the rate of growth of Part B
expenditures.1 98 Annual general revenue contributions have al-
ready risen from 50% of total Part B spending in 1967 to 82% in
1984; and each year the program demands an even greater portion
of the already precarious federal budget. 199
C. Some Observations
Obviously, government spending for health care deserves serious
attention, given the growth rates over the last two decades and the
sizable portion of annual state and federal budgets such spending
now represents. On the other hand, government health spending
has apparently stabilized, at least when taken in the aggregate, and,
in the last several years, state and local spending has even decreased
relative to total health spending. Most notably, Medicaid spending
has also grown significantly more slowly than total health expendi-
tures and the rest of the economy. Only the federal share continues
196. From 1967 to 1984, Part B expenditures increased at an average annual rate of
17.9%, somewhat higher than the Part A growth rate, and much higher than the NHE
growth rate for the same period. See Gornick & Greenberg, supra note 158, at 42-43. That
rate of increase dropped to 9.4% in 1984, a rate obviously influenced by the physician rate
freeze during that year. Predictions for Part B growth indicate that the program will con-
tinue to grow faster than Part A and much faster than NHE growth. See 1985 MEDICAL
INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 195, at 49.
197. Part B of Medicare is funded by the monthly premiums paid by each enrollee
($15.50 a month in 1985), supplemented by general revenues to cover the remaining portion
of program expenditures. See 42 U.S.C. § 1359 (1982); 1985 MEDICAL INSURANCE REPORT,
supra note 195, at 51.
198. Through 1983, the annual increase in the monthly premium could not increase more
than the cost of living increase for Social Security (and Medicare) recipients. Beginning in
1984, however, Congress established premium rates at 25% of the cost incurred by aged
program beneficiaries. This represents a smaller percentage of total program costs, since the
same premium is paid by disabled beneficiaries while the average incurred cost by the dis-
abled is much higher. For an explanation, see 1985 MEDICAL INSURANCE REPORT, supra
note 195, at 8, 51-59.
This formula means that the rate of premium increases will be much lower than the rate
of increase of program expenditures. The net result is that the general revenue contribution
must be increased at an even higher rate than the increase in Part B expenditures.
199. Total disbursements in 1984 were $20.3 million. General revenue contributions
were $16.8 million. See id. at 12.
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FIGURE 9
YEAR END FUND ESTIMATIONS FOR THE HOSPITAL
INSURANCE TRUST FUND UNDER ALTERNATIVE SETS OF
ASSUMPTIONS
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SOURCE.. BOARD oF TRUSTEES, FEDERAL HosprrAL INSURANCE TRUST FUND, 1985 ANNUAL RE-
PORT, H.R. Doc. No. 99-47, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., at 42.
to grow at levels that could be described as increasingly problem-
atic, and most of that can be attributed to Medicare growth rates.
Clearly, the rising costs of the Medicare program present an im-
mediate problem of serious proportions and will someday present
problems of critical proportions. It would be timely, therefore, to
consider major reforms of the increasingly inadequate Medicare
revenue structure. It would be equally timely to address the under-
lying causes of rapidly increasing Medicare expenditures and to at-
tempt to maintain Medicare expenditures within more acceptable
limits, particularly as the Medicare population continues to grow.
Indeed, given the magnitude of the problem, at least as it is pro-
jected into the future, both substantial revenue reform and substan-
tial cost-containment measures will eventually be necessary if the
program is to survive.
But Medicare has not become a cost problem of fundamental
proportions and the focal issue on the health policy agenda of the
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1980's simply because it is an increasingly expensive program, just
as Medicaid and other government health spending programs have
not been exempted from that political attention even as their costs
have moderated. The driving force in Congress with respect to cost
containment-meaning in this context containing the costs to the
federal budget-derives in large part from two political facts: 1) the
gap between federal revenues and federal expenditures has reached
unprecedented levels, and 2) the de facto result of other federal pri-
orities has isolated Medicare and other domestic spending programs
as prime targets for remedying this structural deficit. The reliance
on payroll taxes and, to a lesser extent, monthly premiums to fund
Medicare has further isolated Medicare as a budgetary scapegoat.
At the state level, similar revenue shortfalls have created, and will
continue to create, parallel political pressures for the containment
of the costs of Medicaid and other state health programs, again
meaning cost containment in the more limited sense of the term.
Until these budgetary pressures are relieved-by major changes in
the economic climate or by the radical reordering of contemporary
government priorities--containment of the costs of government
health programs will remain as the primary objective of the health
policy agenda of the 1980's.
This analysis, of course, only outlines the current agenda and
the concerns that are likely to be addressed. Whether the federal or
state governments can resolve the "fundamental problem" of gov-
ernment health costs remains very much an open question. Thus
far in this decade, we have witnessed only the initiation of political
movement. The growing concern for the impact of health program
expenditures on government budgeting has combined with other
political interests to produce noticeable shifts-but only shifts, not
political breakthroughs-in the political logjam that has so often
thwarted health care reform measures in the past.
The congressional approval of prospective reimbursement of
hospitals on a DRG-basis2°° and of physician rate freezes in 1984
and again in 1985201 are surely symbols of an unprecedented will-
ingness to reform Medicare and to tolerate direct confrontation
with provider interests. Likewise, Congress' willingness to pare fed-
eral expenditures for Medicaid and to cut deeply into other federal
health programs during the first two terms of the Reagan adminis-
200. See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 248, § 101, 96
Stat. 324, 331.
201. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 369, § 2306, 98 Stat. 1061, 1070;
Pub. L. No. 201, § 2, 99 Stat. 1665 (1985).
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tration is also unprecedented.2" 2 Only a decade ago, such reim-
bursement reforms and such an aggressive federal posture on
budget reduction would have been politically unthinkable. But the
political posturing of this decade should be considered aggressive
only in relative terms. And these initial steps towards cost contain-
ment should not be mistaken for the initiation of a successful, or
even a sustainable, political strategy.
It is harder to characterize the pattern of political activity in the
states, primarily because the states' agendas have been in large part
reactive to the recent federal measures. But, clearly, the growing
concern for their revenue bases and for the containment of health
program costs have spawned a wide variety of initiatives and re-
forms to directly contain the costs of state programs and, in some
cases, to affect these costs by moderating health spending gener-
ally.2" 3 But both contemporary politics and political history warn
us that neither the direction of states' strategies nor their ultimate
success can be determined by extrapolation from these recent
initiatives.
As discussed in the introduction to this Article, health policy
issues generally, and health cost issues in particular, invariably
translate into frustrating and quixotic political struggles where the
definition of the problem to be resolved is as much in controversy as
is the design of remedial reforms. Nowhere can the fundamentally
conflicting nature of the underlying interests be better demonstrated
than when various levels of government attempt to contain or avoid
the growing costs of health care to their budgets by shifting part of
that budgetary burden to other levels of government and to other
payors.
A successful cost-containment strategy-successful in the sense
that it could achieve the type of cost savings inherent in the budget-
ary demands driving current politics and in the sense that it could
be sustained long enough to achieve lasting results-would require
one of two unlikely scenarios to develop in the next several years. A
fiscally conservative political movement would have to emerge
which would be strong enough to dominate the health politics of the
1980's, allowing both the states and the federal government to
move beyond the relatively modest cost-saving measures of the
202. See Wing, supra note 19, at 42-89.
203. A detailed review of these activities is beyond the scope of this Article. For a survey
of recent state legislative reforms (conducted by the national association of proprietary hospi-
tals), see Special Report: State Legislative Roundup-Indigent Care, FIED. AM. Hosp. REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 12.
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early 1980's and to make "big dollar" reductions in the budgets of
Medicare, Medicaid, and other government spending programs. In
essence, the political resolve would have to emerge to overtly sacri-
fice the public programs to the needs of fiscal policy. Alternatively,
a powerful political consensus could develop around a broader cost-
containment strategy, one that would serve both the budget-con-
scious interests of government and the interests of other payors and
affected groups by attempting to reform the financing or delivery of
health care generally. As noted earlier in this Article, advocates
from both the left and the right have been plotting such radical re-
forms for some time, although historically none have developed a
sustainable political following.
In fact, neither scenario, or any comparable political circum-
stances, appears to be developing in the 1980's. Notwithstanding
the new initiatives and the growing concern for the costs of govern-
ment health programs, cost containment, even in its narrowest defi-
nition, has achieved relatively modest results if measured in dollar
value. As yet, there is little real political effort, only continuing
political rhetoric, directed towards "big dollar" budget reductions
for health care spending or towards systemic reform. Even in en-
acting measures that have successfully pared Medicaid spending,
both the states and the federal government have been extremely
careful to avoid the appearance of containing costs through pro-
gram reductions, even when they have arguably done so. Most sig-
nificant, at no level of government is there any serious movement to
overtly retreat from the historic governmental commitment to
maintaining a Medicaid program for the poor or a Medicare pro-
gram for the elderly and disabled-even while so many bemoan the
costs of that commitment.
There is considerable debate in Congress concerning the next
generation of cost-containment measures, such as prospective reim-
bursement of physicians and modifications of the DRG-based hos-
pital reimbursement. But, at least relative to the size of the budget
deficit and the funds that will be needed to avoid a trust fund deple-
tion, the debate tends towards "small dollar" cost containment.
This is a reflection of the tentative nature of the political movement
that has initiated some cost-containment measures but that faces
substantial political barriers if it is to continue in the direction of a
"big dollar" solution.
Ironically, neither the modest successes of the cost-containment
measures that have been enacted nor the likely failure of any at-
tempts to achieve deeper budget savings through program reduc-
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tions are visibly driving government policy towards the adoption of
a broader health care reform strategy. The reasons for this, as dis-
cussed earlier, lie in the complex and somewhat peculiar nature of
American health politics. Interest groups, even those who might
ultimately benefit under a broader strategy, are compelled by their
divergent and parochial perceptions of the "fundamental problem"
to prefer short-term and temporary alliances on an issue-by-issue
basis. Providers and others who would be adversely affected by
such strategies use their political clout effectively to frustrate re-
form-frequently without conceding that they are trying to do so.
The influence of the general public, as consumers or even as taxpay-
ers, is seldom felt; and when the public call is heard, it is more often
a quicksilver reaction to an anecdotal problem and rarely a firm
demand for systemic reform. Until one or more of these primary
variables is significantly altered, the growing concern for the costs
of health care to the government budgets is certain to remain fo-
cused at the periphery and not the heart of the problem.
The resulting politics are likely to be lively and frenetic, but
frustrating and unsuccessful. Successes will be achieved only at the
margins. Bits and pieces of competition theory will be jerry-built
into existing programs. Regulatory mechanisms will be abandoned
and reworked. Success will be measured not by progress towards
an ideological goal, but rather by short-term budget consequences,
and limited to modest results by the political barriers that have
shifted but not tumbled down.
IV. THE "FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM:" THE GROWING COSTS
OF HEALTH CARE TO THE CONSUMER
Beyond the costs of health care in terms of aggregate expendi-
tures or in terms of how they affect state and federal budgets lie the
costs of health care in the most literal sense: the direct costs to
individual consumers.
Private payments from all sources contributed $227 billion to
health care expenditures in 1984, representing 58.6% of all
NHEs.2 4 This proportionate share has been gradually increasing
in the 1980's;25 by way of contrast, this share had declined from
75% in 1960 to 63% in 1970 and had dropped to a low of 57.4% in
204. See 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 3. Note that private payments are dis-
proportionately higher for personal health care (individual medical services) than for other
health needs. See id. at 10.
205. See id. at 3.
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1980.206 In absolute terms, private payments for health care grew
at an average annual rate of 12.4% between 1973 and 1983 and
grew 9.7% in 1984.207
A. Private Health Insurance
A large portion of these payments are made by consumers
through the purchase of private health insurance. According to in-
surance industry estimates, 192 million people carried some form of
private health insurance at the beginning of 1984, representing
roughly 86% of the population under age 65, but also nearly 16
million people over age 65.208 This figure, however, is somewhat
misleading and exaggerates both the number of people covered and
the extent of their insurance coverage. Not all of these people have
insurance coverage throughout the year.20 9 Further, while most
private insurance includes some form of hospital coverage, coverage
for physician services and, particularly, other services is not as ex-
tensive. 210 Even when a policy covers these categories of services,
coverage is often limited by fixed dollar ceilings, durational limits,
specific exclusions, or by other cost-sharing provisions.21' In addi-
tion, a number of these policies are supplemental, as in the case of
Medi-gap policies for Medicare beneficiaries, and many people
purchase two or more such policies-in some cases, providing du-
206. See id. See also HEALTH SPENDING TRENDS, supra note 33, at 8. Note that govern-
ment projections estimate that this figure will (again) decline into the next decade.
207. See 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 3; HEALTH SPENDING TRENDS, supra
note 33, at 8. Note, however, that the growth rate for subsequent years is predicted to moder-
ate through 1990. See id.
208. See HIAA, supra note 60, at 4-5. Note that these estimates assume a definition of
health insurance that includes a (relatively small) number of policies providing disability in-
come insurance. For this and other reasons, other authorities have estimated the proportion
of the American population with health insurance coverage to be somewhat smaller. See
infra notes 248-51 and accompanying text. The definition also includes all forms of medical
expense reimbursement: indemnity, services benefit plans, and health maintenance organiza-
tions. See HIAA, supra note 60, at 4-5.
The number of people with some form of insurance increased rapidly from 1950 to the
early 1960's, but, not unexpectedly, that number has grown only gradually since then, reflect-
ing little more than the increase in the size of the population. See id. at 10. See HEALTH
SPENDING TRENDS, supra note 33, at 4. On the other hand, coverage of some kinds of serv-
ices, including dental care and services other than physicians and hospitals, has grown more
rapidly, apparently indicating real growth in the extent of coverage. See 1984 EXPENDI-
TURES, supra note 23, at 19.
209. See infra note 250.
210. See HIAA, supra note 60, at 9-14.
211. See S. WILLIAMS & P. TORRENS, supra note 26, at 309-10. For further discussion
of the distribution of cost sharing in private health insurance policies, see Farley, Ginsburg,
Curtis & Wilensky, Private Health Insurance. What Benefits Do Employees And Their Fami-
lies Have?, 2 HEALTH AFF., Spr. 1983, at 92.
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plicative and unnecessary coverage.212
Perhaps the most critical observation after reviewing the pub-
licly available literature is that surprisingly little is known about the
distribution of these insurance policies or the details of their cover-
age or financing.213 What is known indicates that private health
insurance pays only about one half of the private share of personal
health care expenditures. Private health insurance policies paid
$107 billion, 31% of all personal health care in 1984.214 While this
represented an increase of only 6.9% from 1983, slightly decreasing
the private health insurance share of spending for personal health
care, the growth of insurance spending for individual benefits has
roughly tracked the growth of NHEs, at least since 1980.215 Be-
cause of more extensive coverage, private health insurance pays for
212. Medi-gap policies are particularly illustrative. Essentially, they are designed to
cover the cost-sharing requirements of the Medicare program, reflecting both the apparent
preference of many Americans to have comprehensive insurance coverage and the substantial
magnitude of the cost sharing that can be required of Medicare recipients. Two thirds of the
Medicare population have Medi-gap or other supplemental policies. See Cafferata, Private
Health Insurance: Premium Expenditures and Sources of Payment, DEPT. OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES (DHHS) Pub. No. (PHS) 3364, at 3 (1984). For further description of
Medi-gap policies, see Garfinkel & Corder, Supplemental Insurance Coverage Among Aged
Medicare Beneficiaries, DHHS Pub. No. (PHS) 20205, at 10-12 (1985). For a review of du-
plicative or unnecessary insurance, see STAFF OF HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, 95TH
CONG., 2D SEss., ABUSES IN THE SALE OF HEALTH INSURANCE TO THE ELDERLY IN SUP-
PLEMENTATION OF MEDICARE: A NATIONAL SCANDAL (Comm. Print. 1978).
213. Virtually the only source of public information regarding the extent of private insur-
ance coverage and the sources of private payments are periodic national surveys by the fed-
eral government. The National Medical Care Expenditure Survey was conducted in 1977;
that data was supplemented by the National Medical Care Utilization and Expenditure Sur-
vey in 1980. The latter included a sample survey of employers of people who participated in
the 1977 survey. The 1980 supplemental survey was updated in 1983, but those data have not
yet been publicly analyzed. The 1977 general survey should be repeated in 1987. For a
general discussion, see Monheit, Hagan, Berk & Farley, The Employed Uninsured and the
Role of Public Policy, 22 INQUIRY 348 (1985) [hereinafter cited as The Employed Uninsured].
See also Arnett & Trapnell, Private Health Insurance New Measures of a Complex and
Changing Industry, 6 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Winter 1984, at 31, 32.
214. See 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 15-16. Note that total private health
insurance expenditures-including administrative costs-were higher, a total of $120.5 bil-
lion in 1984. See id. at 10.
215. See id. at 15. Private health insurance doubled its proportionate share between 1950
and 1965. From 24% in 1965, it grew to a high of 32% in 1983. In the last 10 years,
however, the growth of personal health care purchased by private health insurance has
roughly tracked the growth of all health spending, although the growth rate in the early
1980's was higher than the comparable rate for NHEs. See 1983 EXPENDITURES, supra note
24, at 12; for growth of NHEs, see supra Table 1. The growth rate in 1984, nonetheless, was
the lowest in at least a decade. See 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 15-16.
It should be noted, however, that total expenditures in 1984 through private insurance
jumped over 10% (due to the huge increase in administrative expenses), from $9.4 billion to
$13.4 billion. See id. at 10-11.
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a higher proportion of hospital and physician services.2 16
The cost of these insurance-financed services, as perceived by
the consumer, may be at least partially measured by the rate of in-
crease in the aggregate premiums paid. Over the long term, total
premiums for private health insurance have increased dramatically,
growing at an annual rate of 14% since 1950 and increasing four-
fold between 1973 and 1983.217 In 1983, aggregate premiums in-
creased 11.2%-a rate noticeably higher than both the growth of
the benefits purchased with these premiums and the growth of
NHEs during that year.218 In 1984, the growth rate slowed to 9%,
slightly below the growth of NHEs, but still higher than the growth
of total insurance benefits for that year.219
Thus, consumers, either individually or collectively, could per-
ceive the growth of insurance premiums as problematic, even in the
last few years when health costs have generally moderated. 220 As a
practical matter, however, most consumers are at least partially in-
sulated from the direct impact of these premium costs. A majority
of Americans receive their health insurance as part of their employ-
ment benefits.221 It has been estimated that employers pay all, or
almost all, of the premiums for nearly one half of their employees
and as much as 75% of all health insurance premiums,222 a benefit
to the employee that is not subject to income or social security taxa-
tion.223 Obviously, the number of people who purchase their insur-
ance directly, either independently or through their employment,
216. Prior to Medicare and Medicaid, private insurance paid for 41% of all hospital serv-
ices. That share dropped to less than 34% in 1967, increased gradually to 38% in 1983, and
dropped slightly to 37% in 1984. See 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 15-17. The
share of physician expenditures has been steadily climbing from 31% in 1965 to 44% in 1984.
Id. at 17-18.
217. See 1983 EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 12; HEALTH SPENDING TRENDS, supra
note 33, at 12.
218. Total premiums were $110.5 billion. See 1983 EXPENDITURES, supra note 24, at 12;
supra Table 1.
219. Total premiums were $121 billion. See 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 15;
supra Table 1.
220. For example, at least through 1983, health insurance premiums represented an in-
creasing percentage of disposable income. See HIAA, supra note 60, at 24.
221. See Taylor & Lawson, Employer and Employee Expenditures for Private Health In-
surance, DHHS Pub. No. (PHS) 3297, at 5 (1981) (estimates from 1977 data).
222. According to government sources, employers paid $82 billion of a total $111 billion
in premiums in 1983. See HEALTH SPENDING TRENDS, supra note 33, at 12. The 1977 data
indicate that employers paid only two thirds of all premiums. See Cafferata, supra note 212,
at 3. In contrast, as many as 13% of employees paid 100% of their health insurance directly
in 1977, including those who purchased group policies through their workplace. See id. at 13.
223. For discussion and background, see CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, TAX SUaSI-
DIES FOR MEDICAL CARE: CURRENT POLICIES AND POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES (1980).
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should not be overlooked. And, obviously, these aggregated data
disguise some variations in premium costs; a small percentage of the
population pays insurance premiums over twice the national aver-
age.2 24 Finally, episodic "jumps" in premium costs for both indi-
vidually purchased and employer-purchased policies are not
uncommon. 225 Nonetheless, there is no indication that the growing
cost of private insurance premiums per se is either perceived as a
political issue of fundamental importance by the consumer public in
the 1980's or that it will become so, unless premium cost trends
shift more noticeably.
On the other hand, viewed from the employers' perspective, the
data describing the growth of health insurance premiums may well
outline a cost problem of fundamental importance, and the resulting
activities of employers attempting to avoid these costs may eventu-
ally draw the attention of the consumer public to the costs of insur-
ance premiums. Employers contributed $82 billion towards the
private insurance premiums of their employees in 1983, an increase
of 17.6% from 1982.226 As Table 10 indicates, this followed an av-
erage annual growth rate for employer-paid health insurance premi-
ums of 16.4% between 1973 and 1983. Even higher growth rates
are predicted for the 1980's.27
224. See Cafferata, supra note 212, at 11.
225. See infra note 228 and accompanying text. It should be noted' that employer-
purchased health insurance benefits benefit some employees more than others. The extent of
coverage and amount of employer payment is directly related to income, occupational status,
degree of unionization, and other factors. See Taylor & Lawson, supra note 221, at 5-10. In
addition, there are a number of interesting variations in the level of premiums paid across
geographic regions and demographic groups, as well as the percentage of the premium paid
directly by the employee. See generally Cafferata, supra note 212.
226. See HEALTH SPENDING TRENDS, supra note 33, at 12, 16.
227. See infra note 234.
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TABLE 10
EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTION FOR EMPLOYEE HEALTH
INSURANCE
Private health Contributions
insurance Total for health
premium total Medicare employee benefits as %
contribution Part A compensation of
Year (billions) (billions) (billions) compensation
1983 $82.0 $18.5 $1,984.9 5.1%
1982 69.7 16.6 1,864.2 4.6
1981 58.9 15.9 1,765.4 4.2
1980 49.8 11.6 1,599.6 3.8
1979 44.2 $10.6 1,458.1 3.8
1975 24.0 5.6 931.4 3.2
1973 18.0 5.3 801.3 2.9
1970 12.1 2.3 612.0 2.4
1965 5.9 - 396.5 1.5
1960 3.4 - 294.9 1.2
1955 1.7 - 224.9 0.8
1950 .7 - 154.8 0.5
SOURCE: Arnett, Cowell, Davidoff & Freeland, Health Spending Trends in The 1980's:
Adjusting to Financial Incentives, HEALTH CARE FIN. REv., Spr. 1985, Table
10, at 16.
Some employers have reported "leaps" in premium costs in the
1980's as high as 100% per year.228 If their share of the contribu-
tions to the Medicare trust fund is included, an expenditure which
has also been rising rapidly in recent years, employers can make a
strong case for describing their total contribution for employee's
health-related benefits as skyrocketing in the 1980's.229 Even in rel-
ative terms, the employers' burden appears increasingly problem-
atic; employers' total contribution for health benefits has been
growing faster than total employee compensation for at least a dec-
ade.230 Thus, the same mechanisms that have tended historically
to insulate many consumers from the impact of the rising costs of
privately financed health expenditures-employer purchased and
tax-subsidized health insurance premiums-may be having the op-
posite effect on employers. Those that have committed themselves
to providing broad health insurance coverage as part of their em-
ployee compensation package now find that this is an increasingly
228. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, CONTROLLING HEALTH CARE COSTS: CRISIS IN
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 1 (1983) [hereinafter cited as CONTROLLING HEALTH CARE COSTS].
229. See HEALTH SPENDING TRENDS, supra note 33, at 16.
230. See id.
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expensive employee benefit, the cost of which is largely controlled
by outside factors.
Not unexpectedly, various employers, as well as the business
community collectively, have been actively seeking in recent years
ways to contain their "fundamental problem" of rising health care
costs. They have formed business coalitions, 231 promoted preferred
provider organizations and other alternative schemes 232 and at-
tempted in various ways to modify employee health benefits or in-
surance coverage.233 Indeed, initial data for 1984 indicate that the
rate of increase in the employers' share of total health insurance
premiums has noticeably moderated, suggesting that these efforts
may be having a measurable effect.2
34
It would be, of course, speculative to assume that this moderat-
ing rate of increase is a direct result of any or all of these employer-
initiated measures or, for that matter, that this trend will con-
tinue.235 It is clear, nonetheless, that employers have become in-
creasingly sensitive to the rising costs of employees' health benefits
in the 1980's and that their efforts to contain or, more important, to
avoid those costs will become increasingly relevant to consumers
and to their evolving perception of the cost of privately financed
health insurance.
B. Out-of-Pocket Payments
Beyond private insurance premiums, whether purchased
231. See CONTROLLING HEALTH CARE COSTS, supra note 228, at 21-30.
232. See id. at 57-81.
233. See 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 6; Health Benefits: Employers in the
Driver's Seat, WASH. REP. ON MED. & HEALTH-PERSPECTIVES (K. Glenn ed. July 8,
1985).
234. According to a private research firm's analysis of Department of Commerce unpub-
lished data, the employers' share of health insurance premiums rose only 8.7% in 1984. This
estimate is based on data somewhat revising earlier published reports on the amount and rate
of increase of the employers' share of premiums. According to this source, employers paid
$97.2 billion in 1984, $89.4 billion in 1983 (an increase of 11.2%), $80.3 billion in 1982 (an
increase of 16.7%), $68.8 billion in 1981 (an increase of 15.4%), and $59.6 billion in 1980.
Telephone conversation with Deborah Chollet, Employee Benefit Research Institute, Wash-
ington, D.C. (May 8, 1986). Note that these data are slightly different from those contained
in Table 11 infra. Part of this difference can be explained by the fact that the Department of
Commerce includes both disability and health insurance premiums under their definition of
"health insurance," see supra note 208, and this may increase the total amount and somewhat
modify the rate of increase. In any event, the decline in the rate of increase in 1984 under
either data set is too significant to be discounted. For a somewhat anecdotal analysis of
recent developments, see BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, HEALTH CARE COSTS: WHERE'S
THE BorroM LINE? (1986).
235. See discussion of various factors that can contribute to increases in aggregated
health expenditures, supra notes 37-70.
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through employment or not, lie the costs of direct or out-of-pocket
payments. Taken in the aggregate, the relative share of personal
health care expenditures paid directly by consumers had been stead-
ily and dramatically decreasing until the most recent decade, as il-
lustrated by Table 11. Consumers paid over 50% of the costs of
personal health care services in 1965; that share dropped to 32.5%
in 1975 and to 28.5% in 1980.236 In the early 1980's, that trend
slowed but continued; but in 1984, total direct payments by con-
sumers increased from 27.4% to 27.9% of personal health care, a
total of $95 billion.237
TABLE 11
DIRECT CONSUMER PAYMENTS
Total Payments % of all
Year (billions) Per capita expenditures
1984 $95.4 $389 27.9%
1983 86.4 355 27.4
1982 77.2 321 27.1
1981 70.8 297 27.9
1980 62.5 265 28.5
1975 38.1 170 32.5
1970 26.5 124 40.5
1967 19.0 91 42.6
1965 18.5 91 51.6
1960 13.0 71 54.9
1955 9.1 54 58.1
1950 7.1 46 65.5
1940 2.9 21 81.3
1935 2.2 17 82.4
1929 2.8 23 88.4
SOURCE: Levit, Lazenby, Waldo & Davidoff, National Health Expenditures, 1984,
HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Fall 1985, Table 4, at 16.
While this represented an average of approximately $389 in di-
rect payments per person and an increase of 10.4% from 1983,238
these expenses were unevenly distributed across the population.
Many people pay a relatively modest amount through cost sharing
236. See 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at 16.
237. See id. The portion of the bill paid by consumers varies greatly according to the
category of service. Direct payments accounted for only 9% of hospital care and 28% of all
physician payments in 1984. On the other hand, almost half of all nursing home care and as
much as three fourths of other services, such as eyeglasses and drugs, were funded out of
pocket during that year. See id. at 27-28; Rossiter & Wilensky, Out-of-Pocket Expenses for
Personal Health Care Services, DHHS Pub. No. (PHS) 82-3332, at 1-3 (1982).
238. See supra Table 11.
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for insurance-covered services or for ambulatory or other services
frequently not covered by health insurance policies; 239 on the other
hand, some people incur extraordinary or catastrophic health care
bills. One study estimated that over two thirds of all families spend
less than 3% of their income out-of-pocket for personal health serv-
ices, with at least one half spending less than 2%. 2' By way of
contrast, that same study estimated that 10% of all families had
out-of-pocket payments in excess of 10% of their incomes, and
4.2% had direct payments in excess of 20%.241
Who are these people and how much do they pay? The fact that
so little is known about these consumers is itself a political com-
mentary. Neither government sources nor private insurers appar-
ently collect or publish useful data identifying out-of-pocket payors
in other than general terms.242 Provider sources tend to describe
such expenditures only in aggregate terms and in terms that primar-
ily reflect the fiscal impact on provider budgets.243 Nonetheless, the
sketchy data that are available suggest that even for those who have
some amount of coverage, insurance does not insulate consumers
from the risk of high, or even catastrophic, health expenses. They
also suggest that this risk is increasing in the 1980's.
Statistics concerning the Medicare population are at least illus-
239. For estimates of the amount of out-of-pocket expenses by the insured, see study
discussed in CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, CATASTROPHIC MEDICAL EXPENSES: PAT-
TERNS IN THE NON-ELDERLY, NON-POOR POPULATION 79-81 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE].
240. See Rossiter & Wilensky, supra note 237, at 8.
241. See id. Analysis of that same data has resulted in an estimate that in 1977 only .4%
of the population, or slightly less than one million people, had out-of-pocket expenses for
hospital services in excess of$ 1,000; coincidentally, a surprisingly high number of people had
no out-of-pocket payments and were hospitalized. See Taylor, Inpatient Hospital Services:
Use, Expenditures, and Sources of Payment, DHHS Pub. No. (PHS) 83-3360, at 5 (1983).
Estimates from another source indicate that 1.5% of the population (individuals, not fami-
lies) in 1980 under age 65 and 5% of the population over age 65 incurred out-of-pocket
expenditures for medical care in excess of $1,000; and 2.8% of the population under age 65
and 16% over age 65 had out-of-pocket expenditures in excess of 5% of income. See Garfin-
kel, Riley & Iannacchione, The High Cost of Health Care 53-55 (July 26, 1985) (in press,
Research Triangle Inst. (1986); unpublished paper in possession of the author).
A more recent analysis of the 1977 data, attempting to extrapolate trends for the out-of-
pocket liability of those with insurance, has concluded that a surprisingly large number of
people with private insurance still run a substantial risk of high out-of-pocket expenses, while
a small number run a slight chance of extraordinary out-of-pocket expenses. See Farley, Who
Are the Underinsured?, 63 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 476, 496-501 (1985). For further
discussion of the incidence of catastrophic expenses, see CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
supra note 239, at 38-45.
242. See supra note 213.
243. See, eg., UNCOMPENSATED HOSPITAL CARE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (F.
Sloan, J. Blumstein & J. Perrin eds. 1986).
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trative. Even with virtually 100% Medicare coverage of the popu-
lation over age 65, that population has to rely on private resources
for roughly 50% of their health expenditures, 25% of which are
paid out-of-pocket-a share that is likely to increase in the
1980's.2' Two and one-half million elderly paid more than $1000
in copayments alone in 1984.245 Long-term care in a nursing home
can cost over $30,000 per year; yet long-term care is only partially
covered by Medicare, Medicaid, or supplemental policies, such as
Medi-gap policies.246
Similar data on the cost sharing or out-of-pocket liability experi-
ence of those who are privately insured are virtually nonexistent,
but it has been estimated that a significantly high proportion of the
privately insured, representing perhaps as many as 26% of the
nonelderly population, are among those who risk high out-of-pocket
payments despite their insurance coverage.247
While the distribution of out-of-pocket payments across the
population, as well as recent trends in those payments, can only be
suggested from available data, some measure of the implications
and importance of these direct payments by consumers can be de-
termined by reference to the characteristics of those who are likely
incurring the largest share of these expenditures. Obviously, most
of the high out-of-pocket payors are those who are uninsured or
"underinsured."248 Estimates of the number of uninsured in this
country have varied considerably, although experts have generally
agreed that the percentage of uninsured has increased in recent
years and may have been as high as 17% of the nonelderly popula-
tion by the end of 1984.249 As many as 20 million Americans were
244. See Waldo & Lazenby, supra note 18, at 25; Catastrophic Insurance, WASH. REP. ON
MED. & HEALTH-PERSPECTIVES (K. Fackelman ed. Apr. 21, 1986). This is roughly the
same percentage of their total health bill as they paid in 1977. But the proportion paid
out of pocket by the aged is projected to increase in the next decade as government cost-
containment measures limit the amount paid by Medicare. Among other things, Medicare
cost sharing limits will increase by 23% in 1986. See Medicare Hospital Cost-Sharing to
Increase 23%..., HEALTH ADVOc., Nov. 1985, at 1; 1984 EXPENDITURES, supra note 23, at
27.
245. It should be noted that Medicare paid 75% of hospital expenses and 58% of physi-
cian services for Medicare recipients in 1984. A very large proportion of the direct payments
by the elderly are for nursing home and other health-related services. See Catastrophic In-
surance, supra note 244. Medicare paid for only 2% of nursing home care in 1984. Even
with Medicaid coverage for those who exhaust their financial resources, the beneficiary fre-
quently pays for one half of the cost of nursing home services with private resources. See id.
246. See id.
247. See Farley, supra note 241, at 477.
248. See id. at 481-87.
249. For 1977 data and analysis, see Davis & Rowland, Uninsured and Underserved: In-
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without health insurance during all of 1984, and somewhere be-
tween 30 and 40 million people were without insurance at some
time during that year.250 Another expert has estimated that the
number of inadequately covered-the uninsured all of the year, the
uninsured part of the year, and the uninsured for a significant por-
tion of their potential medical bills--could be as high as 56 million
people.251
Ironically, the major descriptive characteristic of the uninsured
population is their lack of financial resources. At least one half, and
possibly two thirds, are poor or low-income people.252 A significant
number of these potential out-of-pocket payors represent unem-
ployed workers and their dependents, although the proportion of
the uninsured that are unemployed is also a number that is subject
to considerable debate.253 As noted earlier, perhaps as many as one
half of the uninsured are employed at some point during the year,
although predominantly in low-wage, seasonal, and part-time em-
equities in Health Care in the United States, 61 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 149 (1983).
Recent estimates based on (unpublished) data collected by the Department of Commerce
indicate that 15.5% of the population were uninsured in 1982 and that that figure increased
to 16.5% in 1983. See Financing Indigent Health Care, 44 EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH
INST.-ISSUE BRIEF 4 (1985). Similar estimates were made in A. Monheit, What Have We
Learned From Survey Data on the Uninsured?, speech to the Am. Pub. Health Ass'n 3, 21
(Nov. 19, 1985) (unpublished paper in possession of the author). Another recent estimate
concluded that nearly 17% of the nonelderly were uninsured in 1984. See K. Swartz,
Changes in the Uninsured Population Over Time: Implications for Public Policy, speech to the
AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION (Nov. 19, 1985) (unpublished paper in possession
of the author). All these figures should be compared to the more conservative estimates of
the private insurance industry. See supra note 208.
By way of comparison, as many as 30% of the nonelderly had no insurance prior to 1965.
Following the enactment of Medicaid and Medicare, that proportion has declined until the
upward trend of the last few years. See K. Swartz, supra, at 1.
250. The number of people uninsured throughout the whole year, of course, is much
smaller than those uninsured at any one time. Estimates based on the 1977 survey, see supra
note 213, and similar studies in 1980 and 1982 have shown that the population uninsured
throughout the year is between 7 and 9% of the nonelderly, roughly 20 million people. See
A. MONHEIT, supra note 249, at 3.
251. See Farley, supra note 241, at 499.
252. Defining "poor" or "low income" as income less than twice the poverty level, one
expert estimated that one half of the uninsured-despite Medicaid and other programs-were
poor or low income people in 1977, but that percentage may be higher in later years. See A.
MONHEIT, supra note 249, at 15, 24. Swartz estimated that two thirds of the uninsured in
1984 had incomes less than twice the poverty level-and one third were below the poverty
line. See K. Swartz, supra note 249, at 2. See also Farley, supra note 241, at 477.
253. See Monheit, Hagan, Berk & Wilensky, Health Insurance for the Unemployed: Is
Federal Legislation Needed?, 3 HEALTH AFF., Spr. 1984; Berki, Wyszewianski, Lichtenstein,
Gimotty, Bowlyow, Papke, Smith, Crane & Bromberg, Health Insurance Coverage of the
Unemployed, 23 MED. CARE 847 (1985).
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ployment.254 Nonetheless, periodic increases in the rate of unem-
ployment in recent years have clearly led to increases in the number
of uninsured. 55
Notwithstanding the inadequacy of available data to describe
more specifically the level and distribution of direct payments by
consumers or the characteristics of those consumers, it is clear that
many Americans face a risk of high out-of-pocket payments and
that the burden of these payments falls most heavily on those with
the least ability to "afford" the resulting financial hardship. Some
indeterminate number of consumers face direct or out-of-pocket
payments that will strain or exhaust their income or other re-
sources. Others, in anticipation of those costs, will choose to delay
or forego medical care.256 Still others will seek treatment and be
denied access because of their inability to pay and their ineligibility
for public programs. 7  Indeed, the highest irony may lie in the
tendency to define the rising costs of medical care for consumers in
terms of the amount or portion of health care expenditures that are
direct or out-of-pocket payments. The "price" of direct payments
by consumers should be measured both in terms of dollars spent
and dollars not spent, the latter reflected by the death, disability, or
discomfort of those who find medical care financially inaccessible.
Such human costs are difficult to tabulate in other than anecdo-
tal terms:
-In February, 1985, a thirty-four year old man with a knife
254. See The Employed Uninsured, supra note 213, at 348-57; A. MONHEIT, supra note
249, at 6-14.
255. In 1983, Congress predicted that 9.6 million jobless Americans and an equal number
of their dependents were without any form of health insurance as a result of their loss of
employment. See H.R. REP. No. 236, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (Part 2 1983).
In 1983, following a year of economic recession and high unemployment, the number of
people with employer purchased health insurance declined by one million. See Financing
Indigent Care, supra note 249, at 3-4. The dynamics of this relationship should be noted:
When employment levels increase there may not be a comparable increase in the number of
people with employer-purchased health insurance if rehired workers receive reduced benefits
or if they accept employment without any insurance benefit program.
256. For a review of the differential utilization rates between the uninsured and the in-
sured, and the resulting impact on health status, see Davis & Rowland, supra note 249, at 62-
75. As summarized by these authorities:
[L]ack of insurance coverage has three major consequences: It contributes to un-
necessary pain, suffering, disability, and even death among the uninsured; it places a
financial burden on those uninsured who struggle to pay burdensome medical bills;
and it places a financial strain on hospitals, physicians, and other health care prov-
iders who attempt to provide care to the uninsured.
Id. at 73. See also Aday & Andersen, The National Profile of Access to Medical Care: Where
Do We Stand?, 74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, Dec. 1984, at 1331.
257. See infra notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
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wound penetrating his skull was denied emergency neurosurgery at
a private hospital in San Francisco. Though he received first aid in
the emergency room, the hospital was unable to find a neurosurgeon
to accept the patient, possibly because he was uninsured. Two
other hospitals refused to accept the victim. He died following
.transfer to another hospital.258
-In June, 1985, a fifty-six year old man with third-degree burns
on his side and back was refused emergency treatment at two Texas
hospitals because he was uninsured. He was briefly examined but
refused admission at a third because he did not have a cash deposit
to cover additional care. After seven hours and seventy miles of
driving, he was finally admitted to a public hospital in Dallas.259
-A resident at Cook County Hospital in Chicago reported in
October of 1985 that a patient arrived in the emergency room with
a note from a private physician that read: "Please assume medical
care of Mrs. Smith. She is no longer eligible for medical assistance
and cannot afford to see me."2
60
Other reports of refusals to provide initial first aid in emergency
rooms or to continue treatment following first aid indicate that such
"horror stories" are not aberrational and, indeed, may be becoming
more frequent.26 1 "Dumping" uninsured patients or those without
preadmission cash deposits, even when the practice presents sub-
stantial risk to the transferred patient, has apparently become the
preferred cost-containment strategy of many providers.262
There are also preliminary statistical indications that the rising
258. See Uninsured Patient: Why East Bay Man Didn't Get Treated, San Francisco
Chron., Feb. 6, 1985, at 6, col. 5.
259. See Taylor, Ailing, Uninsured and Turned Away, Wash. Post, June 30, 1985, at 1,
col. 3.
260. See Bernard, Patient Dumping: A Resident's Firsthand View, 34 NEwv PHYSICIAN 23
(1985). Perhaps a more serious illustration of the result of termination of public benefits is
provided by the account of a surgical supply company that demanded the return of a breath-
ing monitor from a former Medicaid patient because the reimbursement order was (incor-
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costs of health care for some consumers are translating into in-
creases in human costs. Maternal and child health experts are now
documenting a slowdown in the historic decline in overall infant
mortality, a nationwide rise in the postneonatal mortality rate
(deaths in the first year of life), and increases in both the percent-
ages of low-birthweight babies and the number of women who have
had late or no prenatal care.263 These same experts have alleged
that these trends are due, at least in part, to the inability of indigent
women to find affordable medical care.2"
C. Conclusion
Does any of the above support the thesis that the costs of health
care to the individual consumer have become a public policy prob-
lem of fundamental proportions? Surely the data suggesting that
there has been a measurable decline in the health status of some
Americans must be seriously regarded. Tracing the causal connec-
tion between rising individual costs and declining health status,
however, is a difficult and easily confounded task. Firm evidence of
this connection, unfortunately, can only be gathered and evaluated
historically. And, given the predilection of most public and private
sources to focus on the financial rather than the human costs of
health care, more convincing evidence may take a long time to
amass, if it is ever to be available at all. Consequently, the public
policy assessment of these troubling statistics may be as much a
value judgment as a scientific inquiry. For those for whom prelimi-
nary signals of declining health status are sufficient to justify action,
then "something should be done" to avoid the possibility that the
apparent trend in these statistics will eventually be validated. For
263. For a discussion of the recent trends in infant mortality, see D. HUGHES, K. JOHN-
SON, J. SIMONS & S. ROSENBAUM, MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH DATA BOOK: THE
HEALTH OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN 3-4 (Children's Defense Fund 1986). Perhaps the most
disturbing statistics are those that document the increase in the postneonatal mortality rate.
In 1983, postneonatal mortality rose 3%, a reversal of a twenty-year trend of declining an-
nual rates; preliminary data for 1984 indicate that the rate increased another 6%. See id. at
3.
Increases in the percentage of babies with low birthweight and in the percentage of wo-
men with late or no prenatal care were also documented. In fact, 5.6% of the women deliver-
ing in this country in 1983 had late or no prenatal care-the third year in a row that this
figure had increased. Statistically, babies born to women with inadequate prenatal care are
three times more likely to die within their first year of life. See id. at 5, 38.
264. A recent study illustrates the connection between indigency and access. Reviewing
care received in a charity hospital in Florida, the Children's Defense Fund found that 30% of
the women delivering in 1982 received no prenatal care at all, that a majority had tried, but
were unable to find, affordable prenatal care. S. ROSENBAUM, POLICY PAPERS ON MEDICAL
INDIGENCY IN AMERICA 23 (Children's Defense Fund 1986).
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those predisposed to tolerate some risk of declining health status or,
more critically, for those whose self-interest may be adversely af-
fected by likely remedial responses, the public policy implications of
these preliminary statistics can always be questioned.
The causal connection between rising individual costs and the
specific accounts of health care denied or foregone is more difficult
to overlook or deny; nevertheless, the policy implications may still
be questioned. Incidents of malfeasance or nonfeasance, for finan-
cial and other reasons, have always plagued American health care
delivery. Are these "horror stories" really becoming more frequent,
or are they merely becoming more frequently publicized? More im-
portantly, what sort of limit on individual financial liability would
be required to avoid their recurrence?
As a matter of public policy, the stronger evidence that rising
individual costs should be viewed as a fundamental problem in the
1980's lies in the aggregated expenditure data. The private share of
NHEs has been rising rapidly in this decade-in sharp contrast to
historic trends. The costs of private health insurance premiums
also have been rising rapidly and disproportionately. Many con-
sumers may be insulated from the direct impact of these rising pre-
mium costs, but others are not. Moreover, for those who have
employer-purchased health insurance, the reactions of their em-
ployers to rising costs may soon serve to dissolve that insulation and
to prompt an awakening of consumer sensitivity.
Available data also indicate that the level of out-of-pocket pay-
ments by consumers, whether insured or not, is also increasing. In-
deed, the increase in the number of underinsured people in this
decade may be the most starkly problematic statistic in this Arti-
cle-if not as a matter of public policy, then surely as a matter of
popular politics. While little is known about the distribution of
out-of-pocket payments actually paid or incurred, or the social or
demographic characteristics of those payors, the sheer size of the
underinsured population may warrant the conclusion that, as a
matter of public policy, "something should be done."
It is fairly predictable that the burden of health care costs on
consumers generally, and on some individual consumers in particu-
lar, will continue to grow in the next decade. State and federal gov-
ernments may have trouble overcoming the political barriers to
their various cost-containment efforts, but, to the extent that they
are successful, it is apparent that their primary objective will be to
limit the costs of health care to government budgets and not neces-
sarily the costs to the consumer pocketbook. If anything, the
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course of government policy in the next decade will increase the
cost burden on individual consumers. Similarly, employers, eager
to limit their share of the increasing costs of health insurance premi-
ums, may experiment with a variety of cost-containment strategies.
Ultimately, however, their strategy of preference is likely to be cost
containment in the narrow and parochial sense, translating into
higher costs for individual consumers.
As noted previously, health care cost containment inherently in-
volves conflicts between competing interests where, as frequently as
not, one group's cost containment complicates another's cost prob-
lem. The interests of consumers, employers, and government
policymakers could conceivably converge on a broad and mutually
beneficial cost-containment strategy; but such a scenario appears
unlikely under current political circumstances. Both private and
public third-party payors are more likely to attempt to shift or
avoid costs than to attempt to contain health care costs in the
broader sense of the term. As a result, the costs of health care to
consumers are almost certain to increase and, consequently, to rep-
resent an increasingly important public policy problem.
The political importance of increasing individual costs may be
even greater; indeed, it may be the key element in understanding
the health policy agenda of the 1980's. Americans, as discussed
previously, display a strong egalitarian tradition with respect to
medical care. Whether funded through private or public mecha-
nisms, medical care is an extraordinarily valued service. The notion
that some people must pay high medical bills, for whatever reason,
is essentially unacceptable. The perception that some people cannot
afford adequate medical care is even more repugnant, even in a dec-
ade where costs may be perceived as rapidly rising. Suggestions
that rising costs have caused women to forego prenatal care during
pregnancy or infants to die unnecessarily-if ever proven conclu-
sively to be true-are politically explosive. Only the most ideologi-
cally committed market theorist-and the most politically naive-
could discount the importance of any perception that medical care
is foregone or denied for reasons of cost in American health care
politics.
This political lesson has been learned and relearned many times.
Both "small dollar" and "big dollar" Medicare reform strategies
must somehow be achieved without the perception that the federal
government is abandoning its commitment to the nation's elderly.
Medicaid budgets may be pared, whether justifiably or not, but pro-
gram cuts must be made in the name of eliminating fraud and abuse
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or improving program efficiency-rarely in the name of service re-
duction. And while many states are attempting to limit their spend-
ing on health programs, just as many are undertaking new
programs to finance "indigent care."
Even the Reagan administration, which has presided over the
largest health program reductions in history, has recently endorsed
the study of a new federal program to finance "catastrophic health
insurance." A variety of schemes have been advanced by neocon-
servative theorists for limiting the multibilion-dollar federal tax
subsidy of employer-purchased health insurance, but few legislators
have been willing to actively pursue them. Such an overt reduction
in government support for health insurance would surely face sub-
stantial political backlash, even in an era when major federal tax
reform is apparently feasible. In fact, while "privatization," "com-
petition," and the other tenets of traditional economic analysis have
obviously become part of the contemporary health policy dialogue,
government implementation of the dictates of neoconservative theo-
rists remains, at best, tentative and experimental. However con-
servative Americans have become in principle, they are still
egalitarian in preference when it comes to accessible medical care.
Surely the health policy agenda of the 1980's will focus on the
fundamental problem of cost containment. But the issues on that
agenda, and the likelihood that they will be addressed, will reflect
both the divergent definitions of that fundamental problem and the
peculiar political constraints within which private and public deci-
sions must be made.
